Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Search After Truth', 'Letters to Fardella' and 'Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
     Full Idea: It is absolutely necessary that everything in the world be either a being or a mode [manière] of a being.
     From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], III.2.8.ii), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.4
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The soul, properly and accurately speaking, is not a substance, but a substantial form, or the primitive form existing in substances, the first act, the first active faculty.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Fardella [1690], A6.4.1670), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: In all of Leibniz's many gropings towards what is at the heart of a unified object, I pounce on the phrase "the first active faculty" as the one that suits me. I take that to be a 'power'. It has two characteristics - it is active, and it is basic.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]
     Full Idea: A true cause is one in which the mind perceives a necessary connection between the cause and its effect.
     From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], 1.649 (450)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
     A reaction: Presumably Hume was ignorant of 'true' causes, since he says he never saw this connection. But then is the perception done by the mind, or by the senses?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]
     Full Idea: Bird argues that there are no finks at the fundamental level, and unlikely to be any antidotes. It then follows that laws at the fundamental level will all be strict - not ceteris paribus - laws.
     From: report of Tyler Burge (Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind [1986]) by Richard Corry - Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? 3
     A reaction: [Bird's main target is Nancy Cartwright 1999] This is a nice line of argument. Isn't part of the ceteris paribus problem that two fundamental laws might interfere with one another?