6 ideas
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
Full Idea: Geometrical concepts appear to depend in some way on a spatial ability. Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of the propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 4) | |
A reaction: I think this is a widely held view nowadays. Giaquinto has a book on it. A successful model of something can't replace it. Set theory can't replace arithmetic. |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
Full Idea: In the Peano axiomatisation, arithmetic seems primitively to involve the thought that 0 is a number. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 5) | |
A reaction: Burge is pointing this out as a problem for Frege, for whom only the logic is primitive. |
16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
Full Idea: It is absolutely necessary that everything in the world be either a being or a mode [manière] of a being. | |
From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], III.2.8.ii), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.4 |
13083 | The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Of the essence of a particular thing is what pertains to it necessarily and perpetually; of the concept of an individual thing on the other hand is what pertains to it contingently or per accidens. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Human Freedom and Divine choice [1690], Grua 383), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 3.3.1 | |
A reaction: This arbitrates on the apparent conflict between his remarks in Idea 13077 and Idea 10382. There seems to be a distinction between the 'concept' of a thing, and the 'complete concept', the latter including the contingent properties. |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
Full Idea: Whereas Leibniz and Frege predicate apriority primarily of truths (or more fundamentally, proofs of truths), Kant predicates apriority primarily of cognition and the employment of representations. | |
From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 1) |
12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |
Full Idea: A true cause is one in which the mind perceives a necessary connection between the cause and its effect. | |
From: Nicolas Malebranche (The Search After Truth [1675], 1.649 (450)), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5 | |
A reaction: Presumably Hume was ignorant of 'true' causes, since he says he never saw this connection. But then is the perception done by the mind, or by the senses? |