8 ideas
| 16705 | Whiteness isn't created in an alteration, because it is just this-being-white [Oresme] |
| Full Idea: If it is said that whiteness begins to be through alteration, this does not hold, because whiteness is nothing other than this-being-white. | |
| From: Nicole Oresme (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1349], I.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 19.3 | |
| A reaction: This innocent-looking remark is dynamite, because it rejects the separability of qualities, which threatens the doctrine of Transubstantiation. |
| 2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: Belief might be accorded the status of core or chief propositional attitude. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.126) |
| 2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: In contrast with Brentano and Husserl, consciousness or attention are no longer seen as essential to intentionality. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, although there seem to be plenty of current philosophers who do not accept it (e.g. Searle). I think philosophy of mind may be stuck in the dark ages if thinkers don't accept this proposal. |
| 6901 | Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge] |
| Full Idea: Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding. | |
| From: Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding. |
| 2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to give an account of concept-formation without a language of thought or representation, based on perception, which in the brain seems to involve information without representation. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.66) | |
| A reaction: This claim strikes me as being a little too confident. One might say that a concept IS a representation. However, the perception of several horses might 'blur' together to form a generalised horse. |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: How else, other than via some form of representational system, could a human organism contain information as a content over which it could operate or 'attitudinise'? | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'representational'. In its vaguest sense, this is just a tautology - content must be held in the mind in some form or other, but that tells us nothing. |
| 2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: It is not easy to employ our folk psychology in the understanding of persons in a very different culture. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], p.241) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a highly significant problem for the friends of folk psychology. It also breaks down in extreme situations, or with mental illness. It seems closer to culture than to brain structure. |
| 2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
| Full Idea: I cannot say I am simply thinking but not thinking about anything. | |
| From: William Lyons (Approaches to Intentionality [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Hard to disagree. However, I can plausibly reply to 'What are you thinking?' with 'Nothing', if my consciousness is freewheeling. Utterly disconnected content isn't really what we call 'thinking'. |