3 ideas
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
Full Idea: It is plainly contrary to common sense to say that the phases in the history of a thing are parts of the thing. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy [1933], I.349-50), quoted by Richard Cartwright - Scattered Objects n18 | |
A reaction: Nicely expressed! To suggest that me ten years ago is a mere part of some huge me, or that you are only talking to a part of me now, is a very long way indeed from normal usage. |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |
20057 | Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele] |
Full Idea: The central task of the philosophy of action is the exploration of the roles played by a collection of psychological states in the etiology of intentional behaviour. | |
From: Alfred R. Mele (Springs of Action [1992], p.3), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 5 'Psychological' | |
A reaction: Stout glosses this as a rather distinctive view, which endorses the causal theory of action (as opposed to citing reasons and justifications for actions). A key debate is whether the psychological inputs really do cause the outputs. |