Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'The Nature of Necessity' and 'The Epistemology of Modality'

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5 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19440 How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
     Full Idea: The main issue with learning possibility from conceivability concerns how we can be confident that we have conceived things to the relevant level of depth required for the scenario to actually be a presentation or manifestation of a genuine possibility.
     From: Anand Vaidya (The Epistemology of Modality [2015], 1.2.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Van Inwagen 1998 for this idea] The point is that ignorant imagination can conceive of all sorts of absurd things which are seen to be impossible when enough information is available. We can hardly demand a criterion for this.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
18383 Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Plantinga rejects other possible worlds, but adds to our world an uncountable multitude of sets of propositions, each set a way that the world might have been, but is in fact not. (Roughly, for each Lewis world, Plantinga has such a set).
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 07.2
     A reaction: To me it seems as ontologically extravagant to postulate unexpressed propositions as to postulate concrete possible worlds. I think the best line is that there is just the actual world, with the possibilities implied in its dispositions.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11891 Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
     Full Idea: Plantinga says for an individual to exist with certain properties in some possible world is simply for it to be true that, had that possible world obtained, that individual would have existed with those properties.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974]) by Penelope Mackie - How Things Might Have Been 5.1
     A reaction: This is intended to dissolve the problem of transworld identity, and is certainly a flat rejection of counterparts. I take the point to be that the individual is the key element in defining the possible world, so can't possibly be different.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6649 Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25
     A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
20704 A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Plantinga reformulates Malcolm's argument thus: 1) There is a possible world in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, 2) A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world.
     From: report of Alvin Plantinga (The Nature of Necessity [1974], p.213) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 4 'b Descartes'
     A reaction: This is only Plantinga's starting point, which says nothing about the nature of God, but only that this 'great' being exists in all worlds. I would like to know why it is a 'being' rather than a 'thing'. Malcolm says if it is possible it is necessary.