7 ideas
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15) | |
A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot. |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules. |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161) | |
A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires. |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164) | |
A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion. |
7469 | There is no hereafter in the Book of Job [Anon (Job), by Watson] |
Full Idea: The entire Book of Job is concerned with faith and suffering and inequality in a life where there is no hereafter (all the rewards promised to the Jews by their God are worldly). | |
From: report of Anon (Job) (18: Book of Job [c.535 BCE]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.5 | |
A reaction: It is extraordinary how such ideas can creep into the great religions, and then become taken for granted, as if no one had ever doubted them. |