68 ideas
| 2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Philosophers are always ready to change direction, if a topic crops up which is more attractive than the one to hand. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 172d) | |
| A reaction: Which sounds trivial, but it may be what God does. |
| 2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A perfect grasp of any subject depends far more on knowing elements than on knowing complexes. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206b) |
| 2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Either a syllable is not the same as its letters, in which case it cannot have the letters as parts of itself, or it is the same as its letters, in which case these basic elements are just as knowable as it is. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205b) |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Without mutual help and the cultivation of reason, human beings necessarily live in great misery. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: A clarion call from a great voice of the Enlightenment. I agree, but in 2017 the rest of western civilization seems to have given up on this ideal. I blame Adorno and Horkheimer. |
| 2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b) | |
| A reaction: If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond? |
| 2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Eristic discussions involve as many tricks and traps as possible, but dialectical discussions involve being serious and correcting the interlocutor's mistakes only when they are his own fault or the result of past conditioning. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167e) |
| 15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A primary element cannot be expressed in an account; it can only be named, for a name is all that it has. But with the things composed of these ...just as the elements are woven together, so the names can woven to become an account. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 202b01-3) | |
| A reaction: This is the beginning of what I see as Aristotle's metaphysics, as derived from his epistemology, that is, ontology is what explains, and what we can give an account [logos] of. Aristotle treats this under 'definitions'. |
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: The view of Chomsky in 1957 that category mistakes are syntactically well-formed but meaningless is a very standard one. | |
| From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm going off the idea that they are meaningless, largely because I am beginning to sympathise with the view that any composition of meaningful components is meaningful (even if blatantly false). |
| 10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It must surely be true that a man who has completely mastered arithmetic knows all numbers? Because there are pieces of knowledge covering all numbers in his soul. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 198b) | |
| A reaction: This clearly views numbers as objects. Expectation of knowing them all is a bit startling! They also appear to be innate in us, and hence they appear to be Forms. See Aristotle's comment in Idea 645. |
| 2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There are two kinds of change, I think: alteration and motion. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 181d) |
| 2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If a complex or a syllable has no parts and is a single identity, hasn't it turned out to be the same kind of thing as an element or letter? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205d) |
| 15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
| Full Idea: But this sum now - isn't it just when there is nothing lacking that it is a sum? Yes, necessarily. And won't this very same thing - that from which nothing is lacking - be a whole? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205a) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be right, be rather too vague and potentially circular to be of much use. What is the criterion for deciding that nothing is lacking? |
| 15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The whole does not consist of parts; for it did, it would be all the parts and so would be the sum. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 204e) | |
| A reaction: That is, 'the whole is the sum of its parts' is a tautology! The claim that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts' gets into similar trouble. See Verity Harte on this. |
| 2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d) |
| 16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c) | |
| A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts. |
| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a) |
| 2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a) |
| 2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Perception is always of something that is, and it is infallible, which suggests that it is knowledge. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 152c) |
| 2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It would be peculiar if each of us were like a Trojan horse, with a whole bunch of senses sitting inside us, rather than that all these perceptions converge onto a single identity (mind, or whatever one ought to call it). | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 184d) |
| 2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: With what physical faculty do we perceive being and not-being, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference, oneness and many, odd and even and other maths, ….fineness and goodness? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 185d) |
| 2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Sight or touch might make someone take eleven for twelve, but he could never form this mistaken belief about the contents of his mind. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 195e) |
| 2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If you can't apprehend being you can't apprehend truth, and so a thing could not be known. Therefore knowledge is not located in immediate experience but in thinking about it, since the latter makes it possible to grasp being and truth. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 186c) |
| 2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If you don't know which letters belong together in the right syllables…it is possible for true belief to be accompanied by a rational account and still not be entitled to the name of knowledge. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208b) | |
| A reaction: In each case of justification there is a 'clinching' stage, for which there is never going to be a strict rule. It might be foundational, but equally it might be massive coherence, or no alternative. |
| 2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Either a syllable and its letters are equally knowable and expressible in a rational account, or they are both equally unknowable and inexpressible. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 205e) | |
| A reaction: Presumably you could explain the syllable by the letters, but not vice versa, but he must mean that the explanation is worthless without the letters being explained too. So all explanation is worthless? |
| 2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If I only have beliefs about Theaetetus when I don't know his distinguishing mark, how on earth were my beliefs about you rather than anyone else? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 209b) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather intellectualist approach to mental activity. Presumably Theaetetus has lots of distinguishing marks, but they are not conscious. Must Socrates know everything? |
| 2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A rational account might be forming an image of one's belief, as in a mirror or a pond. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 206d) | |
| A reaction: Not promising, since the image is not going to be clearer than the original, or contain any new information. Maybe it would be clarified by being 'framed', instead of drifting in muddle. |
| 2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A third sort of rational account (after giving an image, or analysing elements) is being able to mention some mark which differentiates the object in question ('the sun is the brightest heavenly body'). | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 208c) | |
| A reaction: This is Plato's clearest statement of what would be involved in adding the necessary logos to your true belief. An image of it, or an analysis, or an individuation. How about a cause? |
| 2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e) | |
| A reaction: This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools? |
| 2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In the case of a wagon, we may only have correct belief, but someone who is able to explain what it is by going through its hundred parts has got hold of a rational account. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207b) | |
| A reaction: A wonderful example. In science, you know smoking correlates with cancer, but you only know it when you know the mechanism, the causal structure. This may be a general truth. |
| 2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: What evidence could be brought if we were asked at this very moment whether we are asleep and are dreaming all our thoughts? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 158b) |
| 2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
| Full Idea: To say that everyone believes what is the case, is to concede the truth of the oppositions' beliefs; in other words, the person has to concede that he himself is wrong. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171a) |
| 2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Does a relativist have any authority to decide about things which will happen in the future? | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 178c) | |
| A reaction: Nice question! It seems commonsense that such speculations are possible, but without a concept of truth they are ridiculous. |
| 2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In medicine, at least, most people are not self-sufficient at prescribing and effecting cures for themselves, and here some people are superior to others. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 171e) |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The only genuinely free person is one who lives with his entire mind guided solely by reason. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as blatantly impossible to be entirely guided by reason. His point is that it is a subservience to reason which is entirely chosen. Why is that different from choosing to be entirely subservient to another person? |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: In 1957 Chomsky argues that syntax is an independent field from semantics. …To support this claim he argues that the now-famous category mistake 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is grammatical but meaningless. | |
| From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm tempted by the thought that this famous sentence actually is meaningful, although the meaning is fragmentary, and any proposition which can be assembled from it appears to be blatantly false. |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Nature certainly does not create peoples, individuals do, and individuals are only separated into nations by differences of language, law and morality. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.26) | |
| A reaction: Quite wrong, I think. How did languages evolve if there were not already distinct peoples? Do ants and bees only form into colonies by individual choice? All social contract theories seem to make Spinoza's assumption. |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Since the universal power of nature is only the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything it can do, or the right of each thing extends as far as its determined power extends. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.01) | |
| A reaction: A typically ruthless Spinoza idea, very different from the rather ill-founded claims of Locke and Rousseau about the state of nature. |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Each person's natural right is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power. For it is not the case that all men are naturally determined to behave according to the rules and laws of reason | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.03) | |
| A reaction: Locke would have been horrified by this. It looks like hopeless unfounded optimism to claim a natural right to anything. Doomed prey can struggle all it likes, but its right to do so seems irrelevant. Yet we see self-evident injustice all the time. |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: For Spinoza the purpose of society was the extension of human awareness. | |
| From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.24 | |
| A reaction: I like that. Personally I think human understanding is the best aim our lives can have, but I am inclined to see this in rather individualistic terms (despairing of getting others interested in the project!). |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is the purpose of the state ...to allow people's minds and bodies to develop in their own way in security and enjoy the free use of reason ...Therefore the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.06) | |
| A reaction: The core of Spinoza's political thinking. This strikes me as being as close to communitarianism as to liberalism. |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Either there is no sovereignty nor any right over subjects, or else sovereignty must necessarily extend to everything that might be effective in inducing men to submit to it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.02) | |
| A reaction: In the seventeenth century this usually includes the death penalty. Refusal to submit may be fairly passive and harmless, so the issue must concern duties, rather than rights. Taxes, jury duty, calls to arms. |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: As soon as the kings took control [of the Hebrews] the reason for going to war was no longer peace and liberty but rather glory, | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: As Spinoza was writing, Louis XIV had just invaded Holland, solely in quest of military glory. As soon as a leader like Napoleon discovers they are good at war, I assume that the thrill of glory takes over for them too. |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Monarchical minds are always proud, and cannot back down without feelings of humiliation. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.05) | |
| A reaction: This would seem to be a problem in all politicians. As I teacher I found that backing down was sometimes quite a smart move, but you can only do it occasionally. |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is dangerous to depose a monarch, even if it is clear by every criterion that he is a tyrant. A people accustomed to royal authority and held in check only by it, will despise any lesser authority and hold it in contempt. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.07) | |
| A reaction: He is obviously thinking of Charles I and Cromwell. I suspect that the respect for Cromwell in the 1650s was only as a great soldier. If the people miss royal authority, the correct response is probably 'get over it!' |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never succeeded in devising a form of government that was not in greater danger from its own citizens than from foreign foes, and which was not more fearful of the former than of the latter. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.04) | |
| A reaction: The sort of lovely clear-headed and accurate observation for which we love Spinoza. Only very powerful despots can afford to ignore the threat from the people. Stalin was paranoid, but eventually murdered almost everyone who seemed a threat. |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is properly defined as a united gathering of people which collectively has the sovereign right to do all that it has the power to do. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Representative democracy doesn't fit this definition. What 'unites' the people, and where do they get their sovereign right? If my neighbouring village votes to invade mine, I spurn their pathetic 'sovereign right'. |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: [In the first Hebrew state] religious dogmas were not doctrines but rather laws and decrees, piety being regarded as justice and impiety as crime. Anyone who defected from this religion ceased to be a citizen. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.08) | |
| A reaction: Presumably speeding offences count as impiety, and failing to pray is a crime. A critical question will be how far religious doubts must extend before one actually has to leave. Mere doctrinal differences, or full atheism? |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: How pernicious it is both for religion and the state to allow ministers of things sacred to acquire the right to make decrees or handle the business of government. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (1)) | |
| A reaction: Interesting that he holds it to be bad for the religion as well as the state. In Britain we have bishops in the House of Lords. |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: It is not acting on command in itself that makes someone a slave, but rather the reason for so acting. ...A slave is someone obliged to obey commands from a master which look only to the advantage of the master. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: So if I forcibly enslaved you, and then only commanded things which were for your own good, that would not be slavery? If the master feeds the slave, is that not part of the slavery? Most jobs might count as slavery by this account? |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Government is bound to become extremely oppressive where dissident opinions which are within the domain of each individual, a right which no one can give up, are treated as a crime. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 18.06 (2)) | |
| A reaction: One might compare illicit desires, such as those of a paedophile, where it is a crime to act on them, but presumably they cannot be given up, so there is no point in legislating against the mere desires. |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If liberty of thought is suppressed ...this would undemine the trust which is the first essential of a state; detestable flattery and deceit would flourish, giving rise to intrigues and every sort of honest behaviour. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.11) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza specifically defends philosophy, as the epitome of freedom of thought. |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: We cannot altogether deny that treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 20.05) | |
| A reaction: For example, betraying a major state secret. This is an important idea, for anyone who simplistically demands utter freedom of speech. There is also subversive speech, which is very hard to assess. Incitements can be crimes in Britain. |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The freest state is that whose laws are founded on sound reason; for there each man can be free whenever he wishes, that is, he can live under the guidance of reason with his whole mind. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.10) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if is not so much that the state is rational as that it is right. Freedom is submission to the truth. Rationality is only good because it arrives at truth. But is there a 'truth' about how a state should be run? Enlightenment optimism. |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Spinoza's advocacy of democracy on the basis of individual rights was extraordinarily bold for its time, and it qualifies him as the first truly modern political philosopher. | |
| From: comment on Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch. 6 | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. Hobbes may have been the 'first modern man', but his politics was fairly medieval. John Lilburne and co. may have campaigned for rights and democracy, but they weren't really philosophers. |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No offence can be committed against subjects by sovereigns, since they are of right permitted to do all things., and therefore offences occur only between private persons obliged by law not to harm one another. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.14) | |
| A reaction: This slightly alarming remark is the consequence of Spinoza's denial of natural rights. Nowadays we have international law to appeal to. Locke thinks revolution could be justified, but this implies the Spinoza does not? |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People had to make a firm decision to decide everything by the sole dictates of reason (which no one dares contradict openly). They had to curb their appetites if it would hurt someone else, and not do to others what they did not want done to themselves. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05) | |
| A reaction: The last bit invokes the Golden Rule. Being in society does indeed meaning curbing appetites, such as envy and lust. |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will give up his right to all things, and absolutely no one will keep his promises, except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a greater good. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.06) | |
| A reaction: I think Locke and Rousseau would agree with this. It is hard to imagine doing anything other than in hope of a greater good. But what to do when your hopes are disappointed? |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: If people had wanted to keep any right for themselves, they should have made this provision at the same time as they could have safely defended it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.08) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza is wonderful for grasping nettles. The other fans of social contracts seem blithely cheerful about how it is going to work out. But forming a society is like marriage - a risky commitment which could go horribly wrong. |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: In a democracy no one transfers their natural right to another in such a way that they are not thereafter consulted, but rather to the majority of the whole society of which they are part. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.11) | |
| A reaction: At this time democracy means Athenian direct democracy. In representative democracy you are only consulted once every few years, and in between the government can ignore the people (as Rousseau pointed out). |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one will ever be able to transfer his power and (consequently) his right to another person in such a way that he ceases to be a human being. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: Spinoza disdains natural rights, but this is a modest (and pretty uncontroversial) concession. |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: People have never given up their right and transferred their power to another in such a way that they did not fear the very persons who received their right and power, and put the government at greater risk from its own citizens than from its enemies. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.01) | |
| A reaction: I take this idea to be Rousseau's key motivation for the idea of the general will, because you are there supposed to be alienating your natural rights to yourself (sort of). In a democracy you alienate them partly to yourself. |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Hebrews being in this natural state, they resolved, on the advice of Moses in whom they all had the greatest trust, to transfer their right to no mortal man but rather to God alone. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.07) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Exodus 24:7] He calls this the first Hebrew state, which seems to have depended heavily on Moses. Priests and prophets become crucial in this situation, and they may be in conflict about God's commands. |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The order of nature, under which all human beings are born and for the most part live, prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do; it does not prohibit strife or hatred or anger or anything at all that appetite foments. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.04) | |
| A reaction: This is as vigorous a rejection of natural law as I have met with. It is hard to see on what grounds anyone could disagree, other than hopeful sentiment. |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: No one would be obliged by law if he considered it against his faith, and everyone could claim licence to do anything. Since the law of the state would then be wholly violated, it follows that the right of deciding about religion belongs to the sovereign. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.21) | |
| A reaction: This is an era when British puritans emigrate to America, because the state is not sufficiently tolerant. The needs of sovereignty and of religion can be very far apart. You can see those with great religious devotion not liking this idea. |
| 2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible for God to be immoral and not to be the acme of morality; and the only way any of us can approximate to God is to become as moral as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176c) |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Having transferred their right to God, the Hebrews believed their kingdom was the kingdom of God, that they alone were the children of God, and that other nations were enemies of God, whom for that reason they regarded with extreme hostility. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 17.23) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Psalm 139:21-2] So, according to Spinoza, they did not become the chosen people because they thought God had chosen then, but because they were the only state trying to align itself with God. |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The Bible leaves reason absolutely free and has nothing in common with philosophy. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670]) | |
| A reaction: Hm. The Bible may not contain reasoning, but it contains the fruits of reasoning, and it is obviously possible for reasoning to contradict its message. |
| 2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The elimination of evil is impossible, Theodorus; there must always be some force ranged against good. | |
| From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 176a) |