5 ideas
| 16415 | Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the queen of sciences after all, since it investigates what the world is REALLY like. | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: He mentions Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as esoteric metaphysicians. I see a pyramid of increasing generality and abstraction, with metaphysics at the top. This doesn't make it 'queen', though, because uncertainties multiply higher up. |
| 16413 | Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: Material science has found that some features of metals make them more susceptible to corrosion but more resistant to fracture. Thus this immediately implies that there are features, i.e. properties. What is left for metaphysics to do? | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably economists have discovered 'features' of economies that cause unemployment, and literary critics have discovered 'features' of novels that make them good. |
| 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
| Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth. |
| 16416 | The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber] |
| Full Idea: The inferential role of the existential quantifier in first order logic does not carry over to the existential quantifier in English (we have empty names, singular terms that are not even in the business of denoting, and so on). | |
| From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2) |
| 6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
| From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
| A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |