11 ideas
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4 | |
A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions. |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject. |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.271), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.4 |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that the Continuum Hypothesis was not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot refute the continuum hypothesis, and Cohen proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot prove it either. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 10 |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Evidently the 'given' underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], Suppl) | |
A reaction: Yes! The great modern mathematical platonist says something with which I can agree. He goes on to hint at a platonic view of the structure of the empirical world, but we'll let that pass. |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |
17402 | Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
Full Idea: Mendeleev rejected one unifying principles in favour of three basic components of nature: matter (substance), force (energy), and spirit (soul). 'Spirit' is said to be what we now mean by essentialism - what is irreducibly peculiar to the object. | |
From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' |
17399 | Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev] |
Full Idea: Neither mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in mercury oxide; it only contains the substance of the elements, just as steam only contains the substance of ice. | |
From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870], I:23), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Nature' | |
A reaction: [1889 edn] Scerri glosses the word 'substance' as meaning essence. |
17400 | Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
Full Idea: Because he was attempting to classify abstract elements, not simple substances, Mendeleev was not misled by nonessential chemical properties. | |
From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' | |
A reaction: I'm not fully clear about this, but I take it that Mendeleev stood back from the messy observations, and tried to see the underlying simpler principles. 'Simple substances' were ones that had not so far been decomposed. |
17401 | Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev] |
Full Idea: His view of elements allowed Mendeleev to maintain the validity of the periodic table even in instances where observational evidence seemed to point against it. | |
From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making' | |
A reaction: Mendeleev seems to have focused on abstract essences of elements, rather than on the simplest substances they had so far managed to isolate. |