Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'Law and Causality' and 'Causality: Production and Propagation'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


9 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
     Full Idea: Ramsey's Test for conditionals is that a conditional should be believed if a belief in its antecedent would commit one to believing its consequent.
     From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3
     A reaction: A rather pragmatic approach to conditionals
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: If two people are arguing 'If p, will q?' and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge, and arguing on that basis about q; ...they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], B 155 n)
     A reaction: This has become famous as the 'Ramsey Test'. Bennett emphasises that he is not saying that you should actually believe p - you are just trying it for size. The presupposition approach to conditionals seems attractive. Edgington likes 'degrees'.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Ramsey Sentences are his technique for eliminating theoretical terms in science (and can be applied to mental terms, or to social rights); a term in a sentence is replaced by a variable and an existential quantifier.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928]), quoted by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.469
     A reaction: The technique is used by functionalists and results in a sort of eliminativism. The intrinsic nature of mental states is eliminated, because everything worth saying can be expressed in terms of functional/causal role. Sounds wrong to me.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25
     A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon]
     Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4)
     A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon]
     Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8)
     A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon]
     Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent.
     From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Even if we knew everything, we should still want to systematize our knowledge as a deductive system, and the general axioms in that system would be the fundamental laws of nature.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], §A)
     A reaction: This is the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view. Cf. Idea 9420.
Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: Causal laws are consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew everything and organized it as simply as possible in a deductive system.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Law and Causality [1928], §B)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 9418.