Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'Letters to Coste' and 'Leibniz'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The Buridan's Ass case of perfect equilibrium is chimerical. ...The universe has no centre and its parts are infinitely varied; thus it will never happen that all will be perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side or the other.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707)
     A reaction: Can the great Leibniz have missed the point? Surely all that matters is that the ass cannot distinguish the two options - not that they actually are identical in every detail? If the ass is short-sighted, that should be easy to set up.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
     A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There will perhaps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to scent their game at a thousand leagues.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Coste [1707], 1707)
     A reaction: Wonderful. This should immediately replace Lewis's much repeated example of a world containing a talking donkey. We should always honour the first person to suggest an idea. That is one of the motivations for this collection of ideas.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
     Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
     From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25
     A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy.