42 ideas
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: The view of Chomsky in 1957 that category mistakes are syntactically well-formed but meaningless is a very standard one. | |
| From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm going off the idea that they are meaningless, largely because I am beginning to sympathise with the view that any composition of meaningful components is meaningful (even if blatantly false). |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The trouble with appeal to facts in the correspondence theory is that, in general, we have no way of indicating what fact a sentence, when true, corresponds to other than asserting the sentence. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: It is often claimed that coherence is more than 'absence of conflict' between beliefs; it also involves 'positive connections'. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Contemporary coherence theorists are advancing a theory of justification, not of truth, …with those who argue that truth is also coherence explaining it in terms of ideal coherence, or coherence at the limit of enquiry. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The rules of deduction are rules of entailment, not rules of inference. They tell us what follows from what, not what to believe on the basis of what. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.18) |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Asking how many beliefs I have is like asking how many drops of water there are in a bucket. If I believe my dog is in the garden, do I also believe he is not in the house, or in Siberia? | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) |
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not master. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appen p.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the opposite of Descartes' 'doxastic voluntarism' (i.e. we choose what to believe). If you want to become a Christian, steep yourself in religious literature, and the company of religious people. It will probably work. |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Propositional content is inseparable from possible error. Therefore no judgement, however modest, is indubitable. So if basic experiential knowledge has to be indubitable, there is no such knowledge. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Phenomenalism is a form of idealism. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12) |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The point of insisting on the absolute immediacy of sense data is that representation always seems to involve the possibility of misrepresentation. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Acquaintance with sense data is supposed to be a form of non-propositional knowledge, but how can something be non-propositional and yet knowledge? | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| Full Idea: No proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix) | |
| A reaction: An interesting variant on expressions of the empiricist principle. Presumably one can say intelligible things about Escher drawings. |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: What exactly is supposed to be 'justified': a person's believing some particular proposition, or the proposition that he believes? | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: A key distinction. See my comment on Idea 3752. What would justify a sign saying 'treasure buried here'? People can be justified in believing falsehoods. How could a false proposition be justified? |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: A theory that represents working practices as unworkable is a bad theory. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Good point. There's a lot of this about in epistemology, especially accusations of circularity or infinite regress, which (if true) don't somehow seem to worry the cove on the Clapham omnibus. |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: If we are to treat experience as the foundation of knowledge, then experience must itself be understood to involve propositional content. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: This sounds right, but since pure 'experience' obviously doesn't have propositional content, because it needs interpretation and evaluation, then this strategy won't work. |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Empirical foundationists must decide whether knowledge ultimately rests on either beliefs or judgements about experience, or on the experiences or sensations themselves. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: This clarifies the key issue very nicely, and I firmly vote for the former option. The simplest point is that error is possible about what sensations are taken to be of, so they won't do on their own. |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The foundationalists dilemma is to define a basis for knowledge modest enough to be secure but rich enough to be adequate. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
| A reaction: ..And that is just what they are unable to do, precisely because adequate support would have to have enough content to be defeasibe or fallible. |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: A strongly justificationist view of rationality may not be so rational; we want the truth, but avoiding all errors and maximising our number of true beliefs are not the same thing. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 7) | |
| A reaction: An interesting dilemma - to avoid all errors, believing nothing; to maximise true belief, believe everything. It is rational to follow intuition, guesses, and a wing and a prayer - once you are experienced and educated. |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Why should political theory ever have much to do with quantum physics, or pet care with parliamentary history? | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
| A reaction: This hardly demolishes the coherence account of justification, since your views on pet care had better be coherent, for your pet's sake. It's a pity people can make their politics cohere with their ethics. |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Coherence theory implicitly assigns the criteria of coherence a special status. …In so far as this status is assigned a priori, the coherence theory represents a rationalistic variant of foundationalism. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.11) | |
| A reaction: Nice move, to accuse coherence theorists of foundationalism! Wrong, though, because the a priori principles of coherence are not basic beliefs, but evolved pragmatic procedures (or something...). |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: From an externalist point of view, knowing about one's reliability is not required for 'first-order' knowledge. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Ah. 'First-order knowledge' - what's that? What we used to call 'true belief', I would say. Adequate for animals, and a good guide to daily life, but uncritical and unjustifiable. |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: A problem with pure externalism is that it ignores the social dimension of knowledge. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be contradicted by Idea 3573, which allows a social dimension to agreement over what is reliable. I am inclined to take knowledge as an entirely social concept. |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: According to Goldman's early causal theory of knowledge, my belief that p counts as knowledge if and only if it is caused by the fact that p. This is sufficient as well as necessary, and so does not involve justification. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: I take his theory simply to be false because what causes a belief is not what justifies it. I expect my mother to ring; the phone rings; I 'know' it is my mother (and it is), because I strongly expect it. |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: It is not clear what would even be meant by supposing that there are causal relations to mathematical facts. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: I agree, though platonists seem to be willing to entertain the possibility that there are causal relations, for which no further explanation can be given. Better is knowledge without a causal relation. |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Justification requires logical rather than causal connections. That is the point of the slogan that only a belief can justify a belief. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: It seems better to talk of 'rational' connections, rather than 'logical' connections. It isn't 'logical' to believe that someone despises me because their lip is faintly curled. |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The radical externalists' key notion is 'reliability', which is a normative condition governing adequate performance, involving reference to a range of conditions which we decide rather than discover. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: If we can decide whether a source is reliable, we can also decide whether a reliable source has performed well on this occasion, and that will always take precedence. |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: I may reach a belief using a procedure that is in fact reliable, but which I ought to distrust. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: The tramp on the park bench who gives good share tips. The clock that is finally working, but has been going haywire for weeks. Reliabilism is a bad theory. |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 1) |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: All the sceptic's arguments show is that there are limits to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.13) |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: The classical Five Modes of Scepticism are Discrepancy (people always disagree), Relativity ('according to you'), Infinity (infinite regress of questions), Assumption (ending in dogma) and Circularity (end up where you started). | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: I take Relativity to be different from scepticism (because, roughly, it says there is nothing to know), and the others go with Agrippa's Trilemma of justification, which may have solutions. |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Armed with enough theory, we can see electrons in a cloud chamber. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume needs a notion of resemblance where some things resemble a given thing more than other things do, and some may resemble exactly, and some hardly at all. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Causality and Properties §02 | |
| A reaction: An astute and simple point. Once you admit degrees of resemblance, of course, then resemblance probably ceases to be a primitive concept in your system, and Hume would be well stuck. |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Our experiences are logically independent, but they may be factually connected. What unites them is that either they are experienced together, or (if at separate times) they are separated by a stream of experience which is felt to be continuous. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Bk 3 App.) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy §VI.A | |
| A reaction: A strict empiricist cannot deny that the feeling of continuity could be false, though that invites the Cartesian question of what exactly is experiencing the delusion. Hume denies that we experience any link between simultaneous experiences. |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Is the self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference between them? | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix) | |
| A reaction: Locke seems to think there is a characterless substance which supports momories, and the latter constitute the self. So if my substance acquires Nestor's memories, I become Nestor. Hume, the stricter empiricist, cares nothing for characterless things. |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| Full Idea: If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable. We only feel a connexion ...to pass from one object to another. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix) | |
| A reaction: This first part of this is a problem for any 'bundle' theory of objects or self. This is why Hume abandons all hope for his theory of personal identity based on association. You infer the associations, but don't perceive them. |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Every idea is derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix) | |
| A reaction: This spells out with beautiful simplicity how his empiricist assumptions lead him to this sceptical view. No logical positivist could reject this thought. Personally I favour empiricism with added inference to the best explanation. |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Suppose an oyster to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Do you consider any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix) | |
| A reaction: A splendid addition to his earlier sceptical thinking. We could form a different conclusion. Suppose I do have a self. If my multitudinous perceptions were reduced to a single perception of agonising pain, would that remove the self? |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially. | |
| From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality. |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: In 1957 Chomsky argues that syntax is an independent field from semantics. …To support this claim he argues that the now-famous category mistake 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is grammatical but meaningless. | |
| From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm tempted by the thought that this famous sentence actually is meaningful, although the meaning is fragmentary, and any proposition which can be assembled from it appears to be blatantly false. |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| Full Idea: It may be affirm'd, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relation to ourself. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], p.481), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 9.4 | |
| A reaction: Hume says this is for the best. I can't imagine spontaneous love of human beings we have never met. It takes the teachings of some sort of doctrine - religious or political - to produce such an attitude. I see it as a distortion of love. A hijacking. |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume explained cause as invariable succession, and this makes sense as long as the cause and effect are referred to by general terms. … This account leaves singular causal statements unexplained. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740]) by Willard Quine - Natural Kinds p.131 | |
| A reaction: A nice 20th century linguistic point made against a good 18th century theory. |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume confuses 'repetition of impressions' with 'impression of repetitions of impressions'. ...In order of 'force and vivacity' we have: impressions, memories, ideas. This omits the vital fact that memory is memory; the notion of repetition is lost. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740]) by Alfred North Whitehead - Process and Reality V.II | |
| A reaction: [compressed; Harré and Madden spotted this idea] This seems to pinpoint rather nicely the hopeless thinness of Hume's account. He is so desperate to get it down to minimal empirical experience that his explanations are too thin. One big idea.... |