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All the ideas for 'Syntactic Structure', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'Outline of a Theory of Truth'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: The view of Chomsky in 1957 that category mistakes are syntactically well-formed but meaningless is a very standard one.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3
     A reaction: I'm going off the idea that they are meaningless, largely because I am beginning to sympathise with the view that any composition of meaningful components is meaningful (even if blatantly false).
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
     Full Idea: Kripke has a semantic theory of truth which has inspired promising axiomatic theories of truth.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 01.2
     A reaction: Feferman produced an axiomatic version of Kripke's semantic theory.
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
     Full Idea: One of the most popular semantic theories of truth is Kripke's theory. It describes a class of models which themselves involve a truth predicate (unlike Tarski's semantic theory).
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.3
     A reaction: The modern versions explored by Horsten are syntactic versions of this, derived from Feferman's axiomatisation of the Kripke theory.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
     Full Idea: Kripke established that, contrary to the prevalent Tarskian dogma, attributions of truth do not always force a move to a metalanguage.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975], 5.1) by Anil Gupta - Truth
     A reaction: [Gupta also cites Martin and Woodruff 1975]
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
     Full Idea: Kripke showed via a fixed-point argument that certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Anil Gupta - Truth
     A reaction: [Gupta also cites Martin and Woodruff 1975] It is an odd paradox that truth can only be included if one adds a truth-value of 'neither true nor false'. The proposed three-valued system is 'strong Kleene logic'.
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
     Full Idea: Kripke's main contribution was …his classification of the different consistent fixed points and the discussion of their use for discriminating between ungrounded sentences, paradoxical sentences, and so on.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Outline of a Theory of Truth [1975]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 15.1
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference.
     From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2)
     A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know.
     From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1)
     A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether.
     From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
     A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
     From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
     A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option.
     From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3)
     A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor]
     Full Idea: In 1957 Chomsky argues that syntax is an independent field from semantics. …To support this claim he argues that the now-famous category mistake 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is grammatical but meaningless.
     From: report of Noam Chomsky (Syntactic Structure [1957]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.3
     A reaction: I'm tempted by the thought that this famous sentence actually is meaningful, although the meaning is fragmentary, and any proposition which can be assembled from it appears to be blatantly false.