10 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: We must allow ordinary speech to use inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. We speak of digging a well or weaving a cloak, but there is no well or cloak when they are being dug or woven. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.129) | |
A reaction: Nice examples. The imprecision is reduced if I say I am creating a well, because that implies something that is not yet complete. If I say I intend to dig a well, is that imprecise because the well does not exist? |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Putnam claims that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems indicate that there is no 'fact of the matter' whether all sets are constructible. | |
From: report of Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism | |
A reaction: [He refers to the 4th and 5th pages of Putnam's article] Shapiro offers (p.109) a critique of Putnam's proposal. |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
Full Idea: V = L just says all sets are constructible. L is the class of all constructible sets, and V is the universe of all sets. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.425) |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem says that a satisfiable first-order theory (in a countable language) has a countable model. ..I argue that this is not a logical antinomy, but close to one in philosophy of language. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.421) | |
A reaction: See the rest of this paper for where he takes us on this. |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
Full Idea: Experience with nature is undoubtedly the source of our most basic 'mathematical intuitions', even if it is unfashionable to say so. | |
From: Hilary Putnam (Models and Reality [1977], p.424) | |
A reaction: Correct. I find it quite bewildering how Frege has managed to so discredit all empirical and psychological approaches to mathematics that it has become a heresy to say such things. |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong - as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to perceive Body. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.270) | |
A reaction: For the opposite case he suggests a man running, talking or sleeping. He doesn't mention essential natures, but this is clearly correct. We might say that they are properties which need to be mentioned in a full definition. |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.042) | |
A reaction: This may be correct of someone who is insane, but seems unfair to the fool and the infant. At what age do children begin to know things? If speech was just random nonsense, an accidental truth seems impossible. |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], I.062) | |
A reaction: It is hard to conceive of an genuinely insane person deliberately misreporting their hallucinations. They are, of course, the sole witness. |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: He who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Logicians (two books) [c.180], II.058) | |
A reaction: This precisely David Hume's empiricist account of the formation of concepts. Hume's example is a golden mountain, which he got from Aquinas. How do we dream of faces we have never encountered, or shapes we have never seen? |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |