Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'The Material Mind' and 'A Realistic Theory of Categories'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
22026 Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
     A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13120 Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Chisholm's Ontological Categories: ENTIA - {Contingent - [Individual - (Boundaries)(Substances)] [States - (Events)]} {Necessary - [States] [Non-States - (Attributes)(Substance)]}
     From: report of Roderick Chisholm (A Realistic Theory of Categories [1996], p.3) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
     A reaction: [I am attempting a textual representation of a tree diagram! The bracket-styles indicate the levels.]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
19591 Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
     Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
     A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
6386 In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
     Full Idea: There is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Material Mind [1973], p.259)
     A reaction: In no 'important' way can the beauty of the Lake District be reduced to geology - but it is geology. 'Important' to whom? To a metaphysician, I would say psychology does reduce to physics, and that is important, but it is not important to a psychologist.