7 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
Full Idea: Three main reasons for thinking properties exist: the one-over-many argument (that a type can have many tokens), the reference argument (to understand predicates and singular terms), and the quantification argument (that we quantify over them). | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Bits in brackets are compressions of his explanations]. I don't find any of these remotely persuasive. Why would we infer how the world is, simply from how we talk about or reason about the world? His first reason is the only interesting one. |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
Full Idea: The Quinean claims that the application of a predicate cannot, in principle, be explained - it is a 'primitive' fact. | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 4.4) | |
A reaction: I am not clear what 'principle' could endorse this claim. There just seems to be a possible failure of all the usual attempts at explaining predication. |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
Full Idea: For resemblance nominalism the sentence 'the rose is crimson' commits us to at least one other entity that the rose resembles in order for it to be crimson. | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.5.2) | |
A reaction: If the theory really needs this, then it has just sunk without trace. It can't suddenly cease to be crimson when the last resembling entity disappears. |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
Full Idea: The view of 'priority monism' - that the whole is prior to its parts - is controversial, but has been growing in support | |
From: Douglas Edwards (Properties [2014], 5.4.4) | |
A reaction: The simple and plausible thought is, I take it, that parts only count as parts when a whole comes into existence, so a whole is needed to generate parts. Thus the whole must be prior to the parts. Fine by me. |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
5997 | Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh] |
Full Idea: Dicaearchus advanced the view that mind and soul do not exist; there is only body configured in a certain way. | |
From: report of Dicaearchus (On the Soul (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by William W. Fortenbaugh - Dicaearchus | |
A reaction: Pure eliminativism! It is hard to find even ruthless modern physicalists taking such a bold view. Note that he is a pupil of Aristotle, and this does not sound like a major disagreement with his teacher's views. |