13 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
13195 | To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255) | |
A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs. |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
13193 | Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds). |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20) | |
A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible. |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22) | |
A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding? |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23) | |
A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs. |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant. |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended). | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25) | |
A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it. |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
Full Idea: One reason why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.19) | |
A reaction: We also do and don't want children to have the same rights as adults. Rights should accrue with development and maturity, it seems. No one thinks sperm and egg have rights. Why stop at 'adult'? Superior adults deserve more rights! |
13194 | God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant. |
13196 | All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256) | |
A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right. |
13192 | Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252) | |
A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul. |