14 ideas
| 22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
| From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
| A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
| 13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them. |
| 13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: König: there are indefinable ordinals, and the least indefinable ordinal has just been defined in that very phrase. (Recall that something is definable iff there is a (non-indexical) noun-phrase that refers to it). | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: Priest makes great subsequent use of this one, but it feels like a card trick. 'Everything indefinable has now been defined' (by the subject of this sentence)? König, of course, does manage to pick out one particular object. |
| 13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full] |
| 13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Richard: φ(x) is 'x is a definable real number between 0 and 1' and ψ(x) is 'x is definable'. We can define a real by diagonalization so that it is not in x. It is and isn't in the set of reals. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: [this isn't fully clear here because it is compressed] |
| 13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Burali-Forti: φ(x) is 'x is an ordinal', and so w is the set of all ordinals, On; δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than every member of x (abbreviation: log(x)). The contradiction is that log(On)∈On and log(On)∉On. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
| 13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Mirimanoff: φ(x) is 'x is well founded', so that w is the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V; &delta(x) is just the power set of x, P(x). If x⊆V, then V∈V and V∉V, since δ(V) is just V itself. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
| 13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
| A reaction: [mostly my wording] |
| 13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: There are liar chains which fit the pattern of Transcendence and Closure, as can be seen with the simplest case of the Liar Pair. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
| A reaction: [Priest gives full details] Priest's idea is that Closure is when a set is announced as complete, and Transcendence is when the set is forced to expand. He claims that the two keep coming into conflict. |
| 19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
| Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
| From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
| A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
| 20582 | World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala] |
| Full Idea: Critics have argued that a global 'demos' would require a shared global identity. | |
| From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.9 'Epi') | |
| A reaction: The great divisions are religion and language. The great unifiers are sport, arts and entertainment, plus basic human needs like food, health and housing. The reply is that there cannot be identity without differences, so global democracy is out. |
| 20568 | The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala] |
| Full Idea: The advantage of Rawls's method is that the principles the individual chooses are not only fair according to some abstract principle of benevolence, but also the result of rational choice. | |
| From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: That is a very nice way of putting the beauty of Rawls's idea. In modern political philosophy you hear far more criticisms of Rawls than praise. If a philosopher is criticised a lot, it is probably because they have stated their views clearly. |
| 20578 | Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala] |
| Full Idea: Anarchists advocate forms of governance such as communes and associations that are as local and close to the direct control of the people as possible. | |
| From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.8) | |
| A reaction: Which might explain why recent conservative governments have steadily eliminated local government in Britain. |
| 20574 | Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala] |
| Full Idea: A focus solely on utility excludes considerations of personal responsibility and duty, as well as considerations of the basic rights of individuals. | |
| From: Johanna Oksala (Political Philosophy: all that matters [2013], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: [He cites these as the common modern criticisms] The defence is to explain the value of each of these in utilitarian terms. There is a general problem (conceded by Mill) of motivation in utilitarianism. There's not much in it for me! |