Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Recent Debates on the A Priori' and 'Natural Theology'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


8 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
     A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
     Full Idea: Unlike logic, in the case of mathematics there may be no genuine conflict between alternative theories: it is natural to think that different theories, if both consistent, are simply about different subjects.
     From: Hartry Field (Recent Debates on the A Priori [2005], 7)
     A reaction: For this reason Field places logic at the heart of questions about a priori knowledge, rather than mathematics. My intuitions make me doubt his proposal. Given the very simple basis of, say, arithmetic, I would expect all departments to connect.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
     Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
     A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley]
     Full Idea: When we come to inspect a watch we perceive (what we could not discover in a stone) that its several parts are put together for a purpose, to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day.
     From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
     A reaction: Microscopic examination of the stone would have surprised Paley. Should we infer a geometer because the sun is spherical? Crytals look designed, but are explained by deeper chemistry.
From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley]
     Full Idea: The inference is inevitable that the watch had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who designed its use.
     From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
     A reaction: It rather begs the question to refer to an ordered structure as a 'design'. Why do we think it is absurd to think the the 'purpose' of the sun is to benefit mankind? Suppose we found a freakish natural sundial in the woods.
Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley]
     Full Idea: It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made.
     From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
     A reaction: This encounters Hume's point that you will then have to infer that the designer contains similar imperfections. If you look at plagues, famines and mothers dying in childbirth (see Mill), you might wish the designer had never started.
All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley]
     Full Idea: Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature.
     From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This is far from obvious. It was crucial to the watch analogy that we immediately see its one self-evident purpose. No one looks at nature and says 'Aha, I know what this is all for'.
No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley]
     Full Idea: The eyelid defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there, in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils?
     From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], p.24), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 031
     A reaction: Nice to have another example, in addition to the watch. He is not wholly wrong, because it is impossible to give an evolutionary account of the development of the eyelid without referring to some sort of teleological aspect. The eyelid has a function.