Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Psychophysical supervenience' and 'works'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
     Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
     A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied).
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II
     A reaction: The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic!
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
     Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
     From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
     A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Lewis gives an account of causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals (roughly, an event c causes an event e iff if c had not happened then e would not have happened either).
     From: report of David Lewis (works [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation Intro
     A reaction: This feels wrong to me. It is a version of Humean constant conjunction, but counterfactuals are too much a feature of our minds, and not sufficiently a feature of the world, to do this job. Tricky.