Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Emergent Evolution' and 'Thought and Responsibility'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

22026	Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
	From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
	A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

16051	Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
	Full Idea: When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
	From: Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
	A reaction: This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation

19591	Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
	Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
	From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
	A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20166	A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
	Full Idea: A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
	From: Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
	A reaction: Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.