6 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
23249 | The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It is part of the notion of reason according to these philosophers [Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics] that reason has its own needs and desires. | |
From: Michael Frede (Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' [1996], p.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds as if reason is treated as a separate person within a person. Anyone solving a logical puzzle feels that reason has its own compulsion. 'Boulesis' is the desire characteristic of reason. |
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
Full Idea: The arithmetic of ratios and irrational and imaginary numbers can all be reduced by definition to the theory of classes of positive integers, and this can in turn be reduced to pure set theory. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.53) | |
A reaction: This summarises Quine's ontology of mathematics, which tries to eliminate virtually everything, but has to affirm the existence of sets. Can you count sets and their members, if the sets are used to define the numbers? |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
Full Idea: Meaning is essence divorced from the thing and wedded to the word. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: Quine's strategy is that a demolition of essences will be a definition of meaning. Personally I would like to defend essences, though I admit to finding meaning tricky. That is because essences are external, but meanings are in minds. |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
Full Idea: The distinction between what belongs to the meaning of a word and what counts as further information is scarcely clearer than the distinction between the essence of a thing and its accidents. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: In lots of cases the distinction between essence and accident strikes me as totally clear. Tricky borderline cases don't destroy a distinction. That bachelors are married is clearly not 'further information'. |