9 ideas
22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45) | |
A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment. |
304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Are fine things different from or identical to fineness? They are different from fineness itself, but fineness itself is in a sense present in each of them. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 301a) |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Let the incommunicable property of Plato be called 'Platonity'. For we can call this quality 'Platonity' by a fabricated word, in the way in which we call the quality of man 'humanity'. Therefore this Platonity is one man's alone - Plato's. | |
From: Boethius (Librium de interpretatione editio secunda [c.516], PL64 462d), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - Actualism and Possible Worlds 5 | |
A reaction: Plantinga uses this idea to reinstate the old notion of a haecceity, to bestow unshakable identity on things. My interest in the quotation is that the most shocking confusions about properties arose long before the invention of set theory. |
16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
Full Idea: If there exists the knowledge of how to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 289b) | |
A reaction: I take this to be not a gormless utilitarianism about knowledge, but a plea for holism, that knowledge only has value as part of some larger picture. The big view is the important view. He's wrong, though. Work out the use later. |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
Full Idea: If each of you says how many teeth the other has, and when they are counted we find you do know, we will believe your other claims as well. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 294c) | |
A reaction: This is the clairvoyant problem for reliabilism, if truth is delivered for no apparent reason. Useful, but hardly knowledge. HOW did you know the number of teeth? |
19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete. | |
From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33) | |
A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature. |
302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
Full Idea: What knowledge would enable us to live finely for the rest of our lives? | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 293a) | |
A reaction: A successful grasp of other people's points of view might lead to respect for them. Also a realisation that we are not isolated individuals. We really are all in it together. |
301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
Full Idea: Nothing is good except knowledge of some sort. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 292b) | |
A reaction: I've heard it suggested that truth is the only value. This is the Socratic idea that moral goodness is a matter of successful rational judgement. Not convinced, but interesting. |
305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |
Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors. | |
From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a) |