Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'General Draft', 'Thought and Responsibility' and 'Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD)'

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7 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly

22026	Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis]
	Full Idea: Philosophy is actually homesickness - the urge to be everywhere at home.
	From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 45)
	A reaction: The idea of home [heimat] is powerful in German culture. The point of romanticism was seen as largely concerning restless souls like Byron and his heroes, who do not feel at home. Hence ironic detachment.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers

13412	Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
	Full Idea: Not all numbers could possibly have been learned à la Frege-Russell, because we could not have performed that many distinct acts of abstraction. Somewhere along the line a rule had to come in to enable us to obtain more numbers, in the natural order.
	From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.165)
	A reaction: Follows on from Idea 13411. I'm not sure how Russell would deal with this, though I am sure his account cannot be swept aside this easily. Nevertheless this seems powerful and convincing, approaching the problem through the epistemology.

13413	We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
	Full Idea: Both ordinalists and cardinalists, to account for our number words, have to account for the fact that we know so many of them, and that we can 'recognize' numbers which we've neither seen nor heard.
	From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.166)
	A reaction: This seems an important contraint on any attempt to explain numbers. Benacerraf is an incipient structuralist, and here presses the importance of rules in our grasp of number. Faced with 42,578,645, we perform an act of deconstruction to grasp it.

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers

13411	If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
	Full Idea: If we accept the Frege-Russell analysis of number (the natural numbers are the cardinals) as basic and correct, one thing which seems to follow is that one could know, say, three, seventeen, and eight, but no other numbers.
	From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.164)
	A reaction: It seems possible that someone might only know those numbers, as the patterns of members of three neighbouring families (the only place where they apply number). That said, this is good support for the priority of ordinals. See Idea 13412.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

13415	An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
	Full Idea: No account of an individual number is adequate unless it relates that number to the series of which it is a member.
	From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.169)
	A reaction: Thus it is not totally implausible to say that 2 is several different numbers or concepts, depending on whether you see it as a natural number, an integer, a rational, or a real. This idea is the beginning of modern structuralism.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation

19591	Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis]
	Full Idea: An absolute drive toward perfection and completeness is an illness, as soon as it shows itself to be destructive and averse toward the imperfect, the incomplete.
	From: Novalis (General Draft [1799], 33)
	A reaction: Deep and true! Novalis seems to be a particularist - hanging on to the fine detail of life, rather than being immersed in the theory. These are the philosophers who also turn to literature.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20166	A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
	Full Idea: A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
	From: Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
	A reaction: Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.