19378
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Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
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Full Idea:
For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
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From:
Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
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A reaction:
It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
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6011
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There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
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Full Idea:
Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
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From:
report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
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A reaction:
The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.
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