6 ideas
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Derivative truths are of two sorts: some are analysed into original truths, others admit of an infinite process of analysis. The former are necessary, the latter are contingent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.108) | |
A reaction: An intriguing proposal. Hume would presumably see contingent truths as being analysed until you reach 'impressions'. Analysis of necessary truths soon comes to the blinding light of what is obvious, but analysis of contingency never gets there. |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95) | |
A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth. |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: If certain possibles never exist, then existing things are not always necessary; otherwise it would be impossible for other things to exist instead of them, and so all things that never exist would be impossible. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.106) | |
A reaction: A neat argument, though it is not self-evident that when possibles came into existence they would have to replace what is already there. Can't something be possible, but only in another world, because this one is already booked? |
3648 | Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon] |
Full Idea: Empiricists are like ants; they collect and put to use; but rationalists, like spiders, spin threads out of themselves. (…and bees follow the middle way, of collecting material and transforming it). | |
From: Francis Bacon (Cogitata et Visa [1607]) | |
A reaction: Nice (and so concisely expressed). Bees seem to be just more intelligent and energetic empiricists. |
6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |
Full Idea: Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world. | |
From: report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius | |
A reaction: The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it. |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We can regard it as certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way, that he does nothing which is contrary to reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.109) | |
A reaction: The famous optimism which Voltaire laughed at in 'Candide'. I can't help thinking that there is an ideal of God being ABOVE reason. We reason, and give reasons, because we are unsure, and life is a struggle. The highest ideal is mystically self-evident. |