17807
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To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry]
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Full Idea:
In the study of formal systems we do not confine ourselves to the derivation of elementary propositions step by step. Rather we take the system, defined by its primitive frame, as datum, and then study it by any means at our command.
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From:
Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The formalist')
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A reaction:
This is what may potentially lead to an essentialist view of such things. Focusing on bricks gives formalism, focusing on buildings gives essentialism.
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17806
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It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
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Full Idea:
According to realism, mathematical propositions express the most general properties of our physical environment. This is the primitive view of mathematics, yet on account of the essential role played by infinity in mathematics, it is untenable today.
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From:
Haskell B. Curry (Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics [1954], 'The problem')
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A reaction:
I resist this view, because Curry's view seems to imply a mad metaphysics. Hilbert resisted the role of the infinite in essential mathematics. If the physical world includes its possibilities, that might do the job. Hellman on structuralism?
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11248
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Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
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Full Idea:
An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
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From:
Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
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A reaction:
He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.
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6011
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There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
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Full Idea:
Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
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From:
report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
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A reaction:
The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.
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