17263
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Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
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17270
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Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
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A reaction:
I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
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17267
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The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
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A reaction:
If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
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5506
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If soul was like body, its parts would be separate, without communication [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
If the soul had the nature of the body, it would have isolated members each unaware of the condition of the other;..there would be a particular soul as a distinct entity to each local experience, so a multiplicity of souls would administer an individual.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 4.2.2), quoted by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.15
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A reaction:
Of course, the modern 'modularity of mind' theory does suggest that we are run by a team, but a central co-ordinator is required, with a full communication network across the modules.
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21809
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Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Our own soul is of that same ideal nature [as the oldest god of them all], so that to consider it, purified, freed from all accruement, is to recognise in ourselves which we have found soul to be, honourable above the body. For what is body but earth?
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
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A reaction:
The strongest versions of substance dualism are religious in character, because the separateness of the mind elevates us above the grubby physical character of the world. I'm with Nietzsche on this one - this view is actually harmful to us.
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21825
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The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
We may not seek any point in space in which to seat the soul; it must be set outside of all space; its distinct quality, its separateness, its immateriality, demand that it be a thing alone, untouched by all of the bodily order.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10)
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A reaction:
You can't get more dualist than that. He doesn't seem bothered about the interaction problem. He likens such influence to the radiation of the sun, rather than to physical movement.
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21815
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Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance,
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
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A reaction:
This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer.
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6011
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There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
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Full Idea:
Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world.
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From:
report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius
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A reaction:
The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it.
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21808
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Soul is author of all of life, and of the stars, and it gives them law and movement [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Soul is the author of all living things, ...it has breathed life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, the divine stars in the sky; ...it is the principle distinct from all of these to which it gives law and movement and life.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.02)
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A reaction:
This seems to derive from Anaxagoras, who is mentioned by Plotinus. The soul he refers to his not the same as our concept of God. Note the word 'law', which I am guessing is nomos. Not, I think, modern laws of nature, but closer to guidelines.
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21811
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Even the soul is secondary to the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], of which soul is an utterance [Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
Soul, for all the worth we have shown to belong to it, is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous]; reason uttered is an image of reason stored within the soul, and similarly soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle.
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From:
Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.03)
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A reaction:
It then turns out that Nous is secondary to the One, so there is a hierarchy of Being (which only enters at the Nous stage).
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