44 ideas
20981 | What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen] |
Full Idea: What is the ultimate justification for relying on reason? Is reason cherished as a good tool, and if so, how does it differ from blind and unquestioning belief? | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 01 'Critique') | |
A reaction: And can it answer the romantic charge of stunting a rich life? NIetzsche started this one, by asking the value of truth. Proposal: treat others rationally, and treat yourself intuitively. |
20982 | In politics and ethics, scrutiny from different perspectives is essential for objectivity [Sen] |
Full Idea: I take reasoned scrutiny from different perspectives to be an essential part of the demands of objectivity for ethical and political convictions. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 01 'Adam') | |
A reaction: We should distinguish the nature of objectivity from ways of achieving it. Multiple perspectives don't guarantee objectivity. This is peer review in science, and publisher's readers of philosophy texts. What is objectivity? The same as truth? |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Moral realism isn't realism about things, and it seems strange to suggest that moral realism is existence entailing in the way that realism about unobservable is. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: Cameron is questioning whether a realist has to believe in truthmakers. It seems to me that his doubts are because he insists that truthmaking is committed to the existence of 'things'. I assume any moral realism must supervene on nature. |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What possible reason could one have for thinking of some propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn't apply to all propositions? | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: Well, if truthmaking said that all truths are grounded, then some could be grounded in what there is, and others in how it is, or maybe even how it isn't (if you get a decent account of negative truths). |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Orthodox truthmaker theory (Armstrong's) entails Maximalism (that every true proposition has at least one truthmaker), and Necessitarianism (that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of its proposition). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: I think I accept both of these. If you say only some truths have truthmakers, the other truths are then baffling. And how could a truthmaker fail in its job? But that doesn't necessitate the existence of the proposition. |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The truthmaker thought is that explanation only bottoms out at existence facts; for God to give a complete plan of the world He needs only make an inventory of what is to exist. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: He is defending Necessitarianism about truthmaking. I'm struggling with this. An inventory of the contents of my house doesn't begin to fix all the truths that arise from them. Why is Cameron so resistent to 'how' things are being part of the truthmaking? |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The explanation of the truth of the proposition [p] doesn't stop at it being the case that p, so it's false to claim that whenever a proposition is true it's true in virtue of the world being as the proposition says it is. The features often lie deeper. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [He is opposing Jennifer Hornsby 2005] Cameron offers 'the average family has 2.4 children' as a counterexample' (since no one actually has 2.4 children). That seems compelling. Second example: 'the rose is beautiful'. |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Rivals to the truthmaker claim that facts about what there is are the truthmakers, there are theories that add facts about how the things are, or add dispositional facts, or modal facts, or haecceitistic facts, or maybe moral facts. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: [compressed] He seems to think his version has a monopoly on truthmaking, but I don't see why these other theories shouldn't count as truthmaking. The truthmaker for 'live grenades are dangerous' is not just the existence of grenades. |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: It's definitely not sufficient to be a realist that one be a truthmaker theorist, since one can simply be anti-realist about the truthmakers. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: It is not quite clear how unreal truth makers could actually MAKE propositions true, rather than just being correlated with them. |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
Full Idea: If negative truths don't have truthmakers then make no mistake: they are ungrounded. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: What would be the grounding for truths which expressed the necessary preconditions for all existence? Could 'nothing whatever exists' ever be a truth? |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I tend to think that the fundamental reason we can have the correspondence theory of truth is that truthmaker theory is correct. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: [This responds to Fumerton 2006, who gives the opposite view] Cameron gives himself the classic problem of spelling out the correspondence relation (perhaps as 'congruence'). I like truthmaking, but I'm unsure about correspondence. |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
Full Idea: One view says truthmaker theory stands or falls with the correspondence theory of truth, because the truthmaker for p is just the portion of reality that p corresponds to: truthmaker and correspondence can be conversely defined. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: The normal view, which I prefer, is that correspondence is a particular theory of truthmaking, invoking a precise 'correspondence' relation. Hence abolishing correspondence would not abolish truthmaking, if you had a rival account. |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The analytic commitment of realism is that truths are grounded in the world. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: Certain fifth-level truths might be a long way from the actual world, and deeply interfused with human concepts and theories. Negative truths must be fitted into this picture. |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Realism about a discourse is 1) to think that the sentences are, when construed literally, literally true or false, and 2) to think that some of the sentences of the discourse are non-vacuously true. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [Cameron adds 'non-vacuously' to an idea of Sayre-McCord 199 p.5] This is realism based on what is 'true', without specifying 'commitments', so I like it. Cameron says it makes mathematical postulationists into realists. He likes 'mind-independent'. |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
Full Idea: All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'. |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think we should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Max and Nec') | |
A reaction: An interesting passing remark. Presumably there would be unknowable truths about such worlds, which wouldn't bother a full-blooded realist. Indiscernible to whom? Me? Humanity? A divine mind? |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
20990 | Rationality is conformity to reasons that can be sustained even after scrutiny [Sen] |
Full Idea: My main argument can be fairly easily understood in terms of seeing rationality as conformity with reasons that one can sustain, even after scrutiny, and not just at first sight. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 08 'Rational' n) | |
A reaction: We would need to say more about the 'scrutiny' before we had a really good account of rationality here. In Idea 20982 he emphasises the need for scrutiny by other people, and not mere self-criticism. The key may to be invite outside criticism. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
21005 | A human right is not plausible if public scrutiny might reject it [Sen] |
Full Idea: The force of a claim for a human right would indeed be seriously undermined if it were possible to show that it is unlikely to survive open public scrutiny. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 17 'Scrutiny') | |
A reaction: This is a public aspect of Scanlon's 'contractualist' approach to ethics. You can hardly disagree with the idea, though anti-racist legislation in a strongly racist society might be a good test case. |
20983 | The original position insures that the agreements reached are fair [Sen] |
Full Idea: The original position is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name 'justice as fairness'. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 01.4) | |
A reaction: I suppose it insures fairness on day one of the new society, but that might have all been wiped out in the next fortnight, when you find you are the least advantaged as a result of racism. |
20987 | The veil of ignorance encourages neutral interests, but not a wider view of values [Sen] |
Full Idea: The veil of ignorance is very effective for making people see beyond their vested interests and goals. And yet it does little to ensure an open scrutiny of local and possibly parochial values. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 06 'Original') | |
A reaction: Communitarians also make a similar criticism of Rawls - that people in the initial position simplify themselves into pure rational agents looking for 'basic goods'. |
20984 | A social contract limits the pursuit of justice to members of a single society [Sen] |
Full Idea: The use of the social contract in the Rawlsian form inescapably limits the involvement of participants in the pursuit of justice to the members of a given polity, or 'people'. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 02 'Relevance') | |
A reaction: This relates to the criticism of contractarian ethics - that the weak have nothing to bargain with. One can either add international contracts, or appeal to natural human rights. Or we could just be nice to one another? Nah! |
20986 | A person's voice may count because of their interests, or because of their good sense [Sen] |
Full Idea: A person's voice may count either because her interests are involved, or because he reasoning and judgement can enlighten a discussion. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 04 'Diversity') | |
A reaction: Good. Inarticulate people may have strong interests, and articulate and helpful people may be wholly disinterested. But people may have unworthy interests, and may be articulate but not sensible. |
21001 | Famines tend to be caused by authoritarian rule [Sen] |
Full Idea: The history of famines has had a peculiarly close connection with authoritarian rules. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 16 'Famine') | |
A reaction: He cites the British Empire, the Soviet Union, China and Cambodia. There is unlikely to be a local famine if there is free movement of food supplies.342 |
21002 | Effective democracy needs tolerant values [Sen] |
Full Idea: The formation of tolerant values is quite central to the smooth functioning of a democratic system. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 16 'Minority') | |
A reaction: There is presumably a brutal sort of democracy, if the majority in a polarised society agree to crush a minority. |
20999 | Democracy as 'government by discussion' now has wide support [Sen] |
Full Idea: In contemporary political philosophy the view that democracy is best seen as 'government by discussion' has gained widespread support. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 15 'Content') | |
A reaction: The obvious worry about this is inefficiency in decision-making. Also the dominance of noisy stupidity. But citizens need to feel involved, and committed to the decisions. |
20979 | Democracy needs more than some institutions; diverse sections of the people must be heard [Sen] |
Full Idea: Democracy has to be judged not just by the institutions that formally exist but by the extent to which different voices from diverse sections of the people can actually be heard. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], Pref 'Public') | |
A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'democracy'. Should the workplace and the school and the family be democratic, or just the choice of leaders? What can oblige leaders to listen to the people? Listen to, and then ignore? |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
20993 | Eradicating smallpox does not impoverish nature [Sen] |
Full Idea: The eradication of smallpox is not viewed as an impoverishment of nature. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 11 'Sustainable') | |
A reaction: You'd have to be a pretty 'deep' ecologist to defend the carrier of smallpox, or Dutch Elm disease. The idea is included for balance. |
20995 | Capabilities are part of freedom, involving real opportunities [Sen] |
Full Idea: Capability is an aspect of freedom, concentrating in particular on substantive opportunities. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 13 'Well-being') | |
A reaction: This is the 'capabilities approach' of Sen and Nussbaum. The key word is 'substantive' (as opposed to theoretical). We are all free to become astronauts, but.... |
20998 | Freedom can involve capabilities, independence and non-interference [Sen] |
Full Idea: There is no embarrassment in accommodating several distinct features within the idea of freedom, focusing respectively on capability, lack of dependence and lack of interference. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 14 'Capability') | |
A reaction: This relates to Berlin's distinction between negative and positive rights. |
20997 | The need for equality among people arises from impartiality and objectivity [Sen] |
Full Idea: The demand for seeing people as equals (in some important perspective) relates to the normative demand for impartiality, and the related claims of objectivity. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 14 'Equality') | |
A reaction: Either impartiality already contains (analytically) the concept of equality, or the principle of sufficient reason must be invoked. True impartiality removes any reason for preferring one person to another. But what if preference is 'to my taste'? |
20996 | All modern theories of justice demand equality of something [Sen] |
Full Idea: Every normative theory of social justice that has received support and advocacy in recent times seems to demand equality of something. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 14 Intro) | |
A reaction: He mentions liberties, income, rights and utilities. |
20988 | Freedom from torture or terrorist attacks is independent of citizenship [Sen] |
Full Idea: The human right of a person not to be tortured or subjected to terrorist attacks is affirmed independently of the country of which this person is a citizen. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 06 'Exclusionary') | |
A reaction: If rights can only be enshrined in a legal system, then I presume all systems of legal rights should ensure rights like these, irrespective of their nation. A universal charter of rights for tourists and alien residents? |
21000 | If justice needs public reasoning, which needs democracy, then justice and democracy are linked [Sen] |
Full Idea: If the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public reasoning, and that is constitutively related to the idea of democracy, then there is an intimate connection between justice and democracy. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 15 'Content') | |
A reaction: I suspect that he argued early on that rationality required many perspectives in order to later mount this defence of democracy. |
20980 | You don't need a complete theory of justice to see that slavery is wrong [Sen] |
Full Idea: It was the diagnosis of an intolerable injustice in slavery that made abolition an overwhelming priority, and this did not require a search for a consensus on what a perfectly just society would look like. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], Intro 'Classical') | |
A reaction: This illustrates Sen's key points, that we should focus on injustices, which are obvious, and that designing a totally just society has little relevance to justice in practice (which is what matters). Well said. |
20978 | Practical justice concerns not only ideals, but ways to achieve them [Sen] |
Full Idea: A theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reason must include ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterisation of perfectly just societies. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], Pref 'What') | |
A reaction: Sounds simple, but this is Amartya Sen's revolutionary new idea - that justice is not just ideals and opportunities, but what sort of life people actually end up with. |
20985 | Our institutions should promote justice, rather than embodying it [Sen] |
Full Idea: We have to seek institutions that promote justice, rather than treating the institutions as themselves manifestations of justice. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 03 'Institutions') | |
A reaction: The best quote I can find for summarising Sen's view. He criticises Rawls and others for trying to design institutions that embody justice. Our legal system promotes justice. Do our schools and hospitals? The Department for the Promotion of Justice? |
20994 | We must focus on removing manifest injustice, not just try to design a perfect society [Sen] |
Full Idea: The demands of justice must give priority to the removal of manifest injustice, rather than concentrating on the long-distance search for the perfectly just society. | |
From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 12 'Disability') | |
A reaction: So the point is not to understand the world, but to change it? I'd want to put in a word for the theoretical and idealised project, which I see in terms of writing the perfect constitution. You can't just pick off injustices, perceived intuitively. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |