13 ideas
15282 | Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: The two positivist criteria for a scientific theory are that the facts must be deducible from the theory together with initial conditions, and if there is more than one theory the simplest must be chosen. | |
From: report of Andreas Osiander (Preface to 'De Revolutionibus' [1543]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 7.I | |
A reaction: Harré and Madden cite this as a famous early statement of positivism. It seems to combine Hempel and Lewis very concisely. Wrong, of course. It does not, though, appear to mention 'laws'. |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
9758 | To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: A focus on agency makes more sense of personal identity than a focus on experience. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as eminently sensible advice for the beginning of any discussion of personal identity. Her personal bête noir is Parfit, who focuses on what we are conscious of. |
9757 | A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2) | |
A reaction: I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: When we look at our actions from the theoretical standpoint our concern is with their explanation and prediction. When we view them from the practical standpoint our concern is with their justification and choice. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction, which invites us to further subdivide action theory into two branches, with entirely different concerns. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
9760 | Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
9761 | Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard] |
Full Idea: The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal. | |
From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5) | |
A reaction: I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |