87 ideas
| 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
| A reaction: I think it is vital to hang on to this big definition, focusing on ontology, and not retreat (like Kant) to the epistemological question of how humans happen to see reality, even if we are stuck with being humans. |
| 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that after all our attempts at analysis, we have to accept the notions of causality, identity and existence as being primitive and irreducible. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.191) | |
| A reaction: They may be irreducible, but it seems possible that the relationships between them might be revealed (as between Platonic Forms). To exist is to have identity and causal powers? |
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Paradox of Analysis:if we ask what sort of thing an X is, then either we know what an X is or we do not. If we know then there is no need to ask the question. If we do not know then there is no way to begin the investigation. It's pointless or impossible | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: [G.E. Moore is the source of this, somewhere] Plato worried that to get to know something you must already know it. Solving this requires the concept of a 'benign' circularity. |
| 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234) | |
| A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology. |
| 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.219) | |
| A reaction: Meaning there are stronger principles of thought which can trump Ockham's Razor. A few more entities won't hurt. Sound right. |
| 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It appears to be impossible to complete an infinite series of tasks, since such a series has, by definition, no last member. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.290) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints the problem. So are there infinite tasks in a paradox of subdivision like the Achilles? |
| 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
| A reaction: Intriguing. Sounds wrong to me. At least maths seems to need the idea of the 'correct' answer. If, however, maths is a huge pattern, there is no correctness, just the pattern. We can be wrong, but maths can't be wrong. Ah, I see…! |
| 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The Peano postulates imply an infinity of numbers, but there are probably not infinitely many concrete objects in existence, so natural numbers must be abstract objects. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.375) | |
| A reaction: Presumably they are abstract objects even if they aren't universals. 'Abstract' is an essential term in our ontological vocabulary to cover such cases. Perhaps possible concrete objects are infinite. |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
| A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
| A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
| A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
| A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
| A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
| A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Negative facts appear to be supervenient upon the positive facts, which suggests that they are nothing more than the positive facts. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.3) |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I believe that nothing is genuinely related to itself. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.7) |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A property ...is something which is strictly identical, strictly the same, in all its different instances. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Some is gravitation one property, or an infinity of properties, for each of its values? What is the same between objects of different mass. I sort of believe in all the masses, but I'm not sure what 'mass' is. Abstraction, say I. |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| Full Idea: I am against Armstrong's strong categoricalism, that is, the thesis that all basic properties are categorical. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
| A reaction: I certainly agree with this, as I cannot see where the power would come from to get the whole thing off the ground. Armstrong depends on universals to necessitate what happens, which I find very peculiar. |
| 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a blue chair really exists as much as the chair, but is not identified with the blueness of anything else, even if it resembles it exactly. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.361) | |
| A reaction: You are left with explaining how 'resemblance' works if you cannot spot some 'thing' in common. It is an inviting idea, though, because it avoids the ontological baggage of universals. |
| 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The trope theorist says that a cushion is just a 'bundle' of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.362) | |
| A reaction: Certainly if you dispense with the idea of substance (which is clearly bad science even if it is good metaphysics), something like this is what remains of a cushion, though it sounds more epistemological than ontological. Only philosophers care about this |
| 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Tropes seem to be abstract entities because, unlike concrete entities, they are ontologically dependent; ..there are no 'free' tropes, and they must always be bundled with other appropriate tropes to exist. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.367) | |
| A reaction: Only a Platonist would think that a universal property could 'exist alone'. I presume Aristotle thought universals were real, though bound up with substances. |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: I believe reducing all universals to powers is involved in vicious regress. The power is what it is by the sort of actualisations it gives rise to in suitable sorts of circumstances. But they themselves can be nothing but powers... | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 08.3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed wording] I don't see this problem. Anything postulated as fundamental is going to be baffling. Why are categorical properties superior to powers? Postulate basic powers (or basic empowered stuff), then build up. |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Actualism ...debars us from admitting into our ontology the merely possible, not only the merely logically possible, but also the merely physically possible. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the big metaphysical question for fans (like myself) of 'powers' in nature. Armstrong declares himself an Actualist. I take it as obvious that the actual world contains powers, but how are we to characterise them? |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is not denied that statements attributing dispositions and/or powers to objects are often true. But the truth-makers or ontological ground for such statements must always be found in the actual, or categorical, properties of the objects involved. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: This is the big debate in the topic of powers. I love powers, but you always think there must be 'something' which has the power. Could reality entirely consist of powers? See Fetzer. |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm. |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One might want to divide the category of 'universals' into two sub-categories of properties and relations. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This means a Platonic form like 'horse' ends up as a cluster of properties and relations. Is a substance not also a universal? |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A Realistic version of a Regularity theory of laws will have to postulate universals. How else will it be possible to say that the different instances of a certain uniformity are all instances of objectively the same phenomenon? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.4) | |
| A reaction: I disagree. We may (or may not) need properties, but they can be have a range. We just need stable language. We use one word 'red', even when the shade of redness varies. Non-realists presumably refer to sense-data. |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Past, present and future I take to be all and equally real. A universal need not be instantiated now. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the price you must pay for saying that you only believe in universals which are instantiated. |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong takes universals generally, and structural universals along with the rest, to be abstractions from their particular instances. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], p.83-4) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'The pictorial' | |
| A reaction: To me, 'abstracted' implies a process of human psychology, a way of thinking about the instances. I don't see how there can be an 'abstracted' relation which is a part of the external world. That makes his laws of nature human creations. |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Universals are abstractions from states of affairs. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 7) | |
| A reaction: I'm getting confused about Armstrong's commitments. He bases his whole theory on the existence of universals (repeatable features), but now says those are 'abstracted' from something else. Abstracted by us? |
| 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352) | |
| A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail. |
| 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Not every meaningful predicate expresses an existing property; thus 'is non-self-exemplifying' cannot refer to a property, because the property would contradict the predicate. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.100) | |
| A reaction: Needs thought. The example is based on Russell's so-called Barber's Paradox. If it can't be a property, can it be a predicate? |
| 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If sets are particulars, a nominalist may say that 'blueness' is a set of particulars, but which set? If the particulars 'are blue' this threatens circularity - though resemblance is usually appealed to to avoid this. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.355) | |
| A reaction: This supports my suspicion that nominalism is superficially attractive and 'scientific', but when you dig deep into it the theory won't get off the ground without universals. |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: For each particular it is likely that there exists at least one individuating conjunction of properties, that is, a conjunction of properties such that the particular instantiates this conjunction and nothing else does. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong commits to a famous Leibniz view, but I don't see his grounds for it. There is nothing incoherent about nature churning out perfect replicas of things, such as quarks and electrons. Would we care if two pens were perfectly identical? |
| 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: For the conventionalist the world is doomed to merge into an amorphous lump with no real individuality or differentiation, ..but we can hardly make our own identity in the world in the way we are supposed to conventionally create identity for objects. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.113) | |
| A reaction: Very nice argument! We need to 'cut nature at the joints' (Plato), and one joint is screamingly obvious - that between observer and world. You could try denying this, but it would be a bizarre view. |
| 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: A statue is a kind of object which cannot survive much change to its shape, unlike a lump of bronze, which cannot survive any change to its material composition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.70) | |
| A reaction: Also the statue could survive being hollowed out, changing its material composition. Hence a statue is not just a lump of bronze, but we knew that. |
| 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The parts of a ship in a warehouse belong to no ship at all, ..and once they are appropriated by another ship they cease to be parts of the original, ..so it seems that the renovated ship (not the reconstruction) is identified with the original. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.31) | |
| A reaction: The parts in the warehouse could belong to the original (they might even labelled), but assigning them to a new ship does indeed look like a crucial break in the continuity. |
| 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If we say that up to 5% of a ship's parts can be replaced without the ship ceasing to exist, we could replace 4% and then 4% again, and it would retain its identity, if identity is transitive. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.26) | |
| A reaction: One suspected that all attempts at precision with the ship of Theseus were doomed, but this nicely demonstrates it. |
| 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If a ship is renovated without reconstruction of original parts, we happily identify the renovation with the original; if there was a reconstruction without the renovated version, we would identify the reconstruction with the original. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.27) | |
| A reaction: This really shakes our belief in identity as a natural rather than mental phenomenon. The existence of clones undermines our normal idea of personal identity. |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to rule out as pseudo-properties such things as the identity of a thing with itself. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2) | |
| A reaction: Good on you, David. |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The Identity of Indiscernibles (no two objects can possess exactly the same properties) is not the same as Leibniz's Law (what is true of a thing is true of what is identical with that thing). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.62) | |
| A reaction: Two things can't be the same because we can't discern the difference, which may be our inadequacy. But if they actually have identical properties, it is hard to see how they could be different. A universe with just two perfect spheres is couterexample. |
| 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Reasoning itself depends upon a grasp of possibilities, because a valid argument is one in which it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.11) | |
| A reaction: A very valuable corrective to my pessimistic view of philosophers' attempts to understand metaphysical necessity. But if we can only grasp natural necessity, then all reason is naturalistic. |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It may be that the necessary/contingent distinction is tied to a metaphysics which recognises possibility as a real something wider than actuality. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11.2) | |
| A reaction: Armstrong responds by trying to give an account of possibility in terms of 'combinations' from actuality. I think powers offer a much better strategy. |
| 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It may be possible to eliminate the modal operators (in English, 'is possible' and 'is necessary') in favour of quantifier expressions with variables ranging over possible worlds. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.121) | |
| A reaction: Hence 'necessary' becomes 'exists/is true in all possible worlds'. Deep problems, but at least we must show that referring to 'possible' worlds isn't a circular explanation of 'is possible'. |
| 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Although unfalsifiability is probably a defect in scientific hypothesis, because it is deprived of empirical content, it seems rather to be a virtue in a metaphysical hypothesis. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.241) | |
| A reaction: Presumably nothing could ever be found to count against a necessary truth. A nice point. 'Find me an instance where 2+2 is not 4'. |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Many philosophers of science have distinguished between 'simple induction' - the argument from observed Fs to all Fs - and the argument to hidden or theoretical entities (Peirce's 'abduction'). | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
| A reaction: 'Abduction' is (roughly) the same is inference to the best explanation, of which I am a great fan. |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is plausible to say, on the basis of total science, that 'grue' is a predicate to which no genuine, that is, unitary, universal corresponds. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The predicate 'grue' involves essential reference to a particular time, which 'green' does not. Also on the 'grue' hypothesis a change occurs in emeralds in a way that change does not occur on the 'green' hypothesis. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.5) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to think that comparing 'grue' with 'green' is a category mistake. 'Grue' is a behaviour. Armstrong says this is no objection, because Goodman's argument is purely formal. |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: We could rewrite the generalisation as For all x, ((x is a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is black) v (x is not a raven and x is not black)). Instances of any one of the three disjuncts will do as confirmation. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.3) | |
| A reaction: A nice clarification. |
| 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: There are some entities which exist in time and space (such as persons or social groups) of which the behaviour seems to be subject to rational rather than merely causal explanation. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This begs of the question of whether 'rational' can be reduced to causal. We can't manage causal explanations of the very complex, so we use broad-brush second-best explanations? |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A good reason for P is not necessarily an explanation of P. The presence of smoke is a good reason for thinking that fire is present. But it is not an explanation of the presence of fire. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.2) | |
| A reaction: This may be an equivocation on 'the reason for'. Smoke is a reason for thinking there is a fire, but no one would propose it as a reason for the fire. If the reason for the fire was arson, that would seem to explain it as well. |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Given the Regularity theory, the explanatory element seems to vanish. For to say that all the observed Fs are Gs because all the Fs are Gs involves explaining the observations in terms of themselves. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.7) | |
| A reaction: This point cries out, it is so obvious (once spotted). Tigers are ferocious because all tigers are ferocious (see?). |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The best explanation explains the most by means of the least. Explanation unifies. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 05.4) | |
| A reaction: To get unification, you need to cite the diversity of what is explained, and not the mere quantity. The force of gravity unifies because it applies to such a diversity of things. |
| 21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
| 21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
| A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: To every subject, its appropriate level of abstraction. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: Mathematics rises through many levels of abstraction. Economics can be very concrete or very abstract. It think it is clearer to talk of being 'general', rather than 'abstract'. |
| 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The centre of mass of the solar system seems to lack causal powers, and so is an abstract object, even though it has a location and movement. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Nice example, with rich ramifications. Abstraction is deeply tied into our understanding of the physical world, and our concept of identity. |
| 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Concrete objects possess causal powers and relations, but abstract objects are incapable of having causal powers or relations. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.368) | |
| A reaction: Is this an observation or a definition? One might claim that an abstraction (such as a political ideal) can acquire causal power through a conscious mnd. |
| 21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of ''good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') |
| 21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
| A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
| 21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
| A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
| 21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
| A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: No serious and principled deduction of the phenomena from the One has ever been given, or looks likely to be given. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11) | |
| A reaction: This seems to pick out the best reason why hardly anybody (apart from Jonathan Schaffer) takes the One seriously. |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Lacks and absences could perhaps by thought of as effects, but we ought to be deeply reluctant to think of them as causes. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) | |
| A reaction: Odd. So we allow that they exist (as effects), but then deny that they have any causal powers? |
| 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176) | |
| A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure. |
| 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211) | |
| A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept. |
| 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173) | |
| A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy? |
| 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179) | |
| A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions. |
| 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190) | |
| A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible. |
| 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182) | |
| A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable. |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: A universe could hardly consist of laws and nothing else. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.4) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Discuss. How does a universe come into existence, if there are no laws to guide its creation? |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The scientist trying to establish the geography and history of the unobserved portion of the universe must depend upon what he takes to be the laws of the universe. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: This does seem to be the prime reason why we wish to invoke 'laws', but we could just as well say that we have to rely on induction. Spot patterns, then expect more of the same. Spot necessities? Mathematics is very valuable here, of course. |
| 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| Full Idea: For Lowe law statements are in a sense about what 'ought' to be the case. The 'ought' is not an explicitly moral or anthropomorphic one but instead tells us what is the natural behaviour of kind members. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002]) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 8.6 | |
| A reaction: This is the 'normative' view of laws (as opposed to the intentional, dispositional, or regularity accounts). They cite Lowe 1989 Ch.8. The obvious immediate problem is things which evolved for one purpose and end up being used for another. |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Three degress of law: 1) 'Oaken laws' where all Fs that aren't Hs are Gs; 2) 'Iron' laws where all Fs are Gs; and 3) 'Steel' laws where all Fs must be Gs. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [My summary of Armstrong's distinction] One response is to say that all laws are actually Oaken - see Mumfor and Mumford/Lill Anjum. It's all ceteris paribus. |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Newton's First Law of Motion tells us what happens to a body which is not acted upon by a force. Yet it may be that the antecedent of the law is never instantiated. It may be that every body that there is, is acted upon by some force. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.7) |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong's theory holds that what makes certain regularities lawful are second-order states of affairs N(F,G) in which the two ordinary first-order universals F and G are related by a certain dyadic second-order universal N. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by David Lewis - New work for a theory of universals 'Laws and C' | |
| A reaction: [see Lewis's footnote] I take the view (from Shoemaker and Ellis) that laws of nature are just plain regularities which arise from the hierarchy of natural kinds. We don't need a commitment to 'universals'. |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: It is a Humean uniformity that no race of ravens is white-feathered. Hence, if the Naive Regularity analysis of law is correct, it is a law that no race of ravens is white-feathered, that is, such a race is physically impossible. A most unwelcome result. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.6) | |
| A reaction: Chapters 2-4 of Armstrong are a storming attack on the regularity view of laws of nature, and this idea is particularly nice. Laws must refer to what could happen, not what happens to happen. |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: There is an utterly natural idea that the laws of nature link properties with properties. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.3) | |
| A reaction: Put it this way: given that properties are expressions of invariant powers, the interaction of two properties will (ceteris paribus) be invariant, and laws are just invariances in natural behaviour. |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: My own view is simple: the laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive. …They are preferable in point of familiarity to such necessitation relations between universals. | |
| From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 1.4 | |
| A reaction: I think you make natures of things primitive, and reduce laws to regularities and universals to resemblances. Job done. Natures are even more 'familiar' as primitives than laws are. |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: The two criticisms levelled against Armstrong are that it is unclear what his relation of contingent necessitation is, and that it is unclear how it is able to necessitate anything. | |
| From: comment on David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.1.2 | |
| A reaction: I suppose someone has to explore the middle ground between the mere contingencies of Humean regularities and the strong necessities of scientific essentialism. The area doesn't, however, look promising. |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Counterfactual analyses of event causation don't seem to work, because 'if Napoleon hadn't been born he wouldn't have died' is true, but doesn't mean his birth caused his death. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.161) | |
| A reaction: Nice counterexample, which looks pretty conclusive. Birth makes death possible; it creates the necessary conditions within which it can be caused. |
| 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If motion just is change of distance between two objects, it does not involve any kind of intrinsic change in the objects in question. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.242) | |
| A reaction: It sound respectably relativistic, but I doubt the definition. x is moving relative to y, then y attains x's velocity, so x ceases to move? Maybe. |
| 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space at all, but just 'limits' of certain kinds, and as such 'abstract' entities. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.254) | |
| A reaction: This is fairly crucial when dealing with Zeno's paradoxes. How many points in a line? How long to get through a point? |
| 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: If space does not exist at all, but is only relations between objects, what could one possibly mean by saying that there is a place which is unoccupied by any material object? And what determines whether space is bounded? | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.264) | |
| A reaction: Correct. People who assert that space is only relational have been misled by what we can know about space, not what it is. |
| 21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
| Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
| From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
| A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |