14 ideas
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how the emotivist can accommodate the amoralist - one who recognises moral requirements but is indifferent to them. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche recognised current morals, but was indifferent to them. It is hard to imagine, though, an amoralist who lacked all the feelings which imply morality. |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
Full Idea: Critics of emotivism claim that moral agreement need not track agreement in attitude; moralists with the same attitude can disagree in their views, and they can hold the same view while disagreeing in attitude. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Thus two racists can disagree about how racists should behave. Sounds like a good criticism. |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
Full Idea: By stressing the intimate connection between moral judgements and the agent's non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture the motivational properties of moral judgement. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.223) | |
A reaction: The same claim is made by contractarians, who start from our universal self-interest. Emotivists also nicely capture the motivation properties of immoral judgements. |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
Full Idea: If you want to recognise the truth of some moral judgements, perhaps to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivists' tendency to appeal to the redundancy theory of truth. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: Probably thinking of Simon Blackburn. People who adopt a redundancy view of truth for semantics are left floundering when discussing what is true in the rest of philosophy. |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
Full Idea: Emotivism suggests that different feelings lead to different individual meanings for moral terms, but critics say that meanings are the same, and disagreement is about the extension (range of reference) of the terms. | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: It's hard to see how 'ought to p' could have quite different meanings for an emotivist and (say) a theistic moralist. 'Ought' is an obvious and simple word. Good criticism. |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
Full Idea: It is hard for the emotivist to give an analysis of the occurrence of moral ideas in unasserted contexts, such as "IF he did wrong, then he should be punished". | |
From: David O. Brink (Emotivism [1995], p.224) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Frege-Geach Problem'. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
8592 | Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Because of the multidimensionality of space and unidimensionality of time, empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not. | |
From: report of Jonathan Bennett (Kant's Analytic [1966], p.175) by Sydney Shoemaker - Time Without Change p.49 n4 | |
A reaction: An interesting observation, which could have been used by Samuel Clarke in his attempts to prove absolute space to Leibniz. The point does not prove absolute space, of course, but it seems to make a difference. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |