25 ideas
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If a relation holds between two properties as a result of their intrinsic natures, then it appears the relation between the properties is not needed to do the structuring of reality; the properties themselves suffice to fix the structure. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.1) | |
A reaction: [the first bit quotes Jubien 2007] He cites a group of scientific essentialists as spokesmen for this view. Sounds right to me. No on seems able to pin down what a relation is - which may be because there is no such entity. |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Scientific practice seems aimed precisely at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.3) | |
A reaction: Good. Friends of powers should look at this nice paper by Jacobs. There is a good degree of support for this view from pronouncements of modern scientists. If scientists don't support it, they should. Otherwise they are trapped in the superficial. |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: The source of powers is not the laws of nature; it is the powerful nature of the ordinary properties of concrete particulars. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This pithily summarises my own view. People who think the powers of the world derive from the laws either have an implicit religious framework, or they are giving no thought at all to the ontological status of the laws. |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: To be possible is just to be one of the many manifestations of some power, and to be impossible is to be a manifestation of no power. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2.1) | |
A reaction: [This remark occurs in a discussion of theistic Aristotelianism] I like this. If we say that something is possible, the correct question is to ask what power could bring it about. |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A non-actual state of affairs in possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.2) | |
A reaction: [He is quoting A.R. Pruss 2002] That seems exactly right. Of course the initial substance(s) might create a further substance, such as a transuranic element, which then produces the state of affairs. I favour this strongly actualist view. |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is an invitation to consider what the properties picked out by the antecedent are powers for (where Lewis 1973 took it to be an invitation to consider what goes on in a selected possible world). | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4.3) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple proposal from Jacobs, with which I agree. This seems to be an expansion of the Ramsey test for conditionals, where you consider the antecedent being true, and see what follows. What, we ask Ramsey, would make it follow? |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others. |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account. |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Together with a definition of possibility and necessity in terms of counterfactuals, the powers semantics of counterfactuals generates a semantics for modality that appeals to causal powers and not possible worlds. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: Wonderful. Just what the doctor ordered. The only caveat is that if we say that reality is built up from fundamental powers, then might those powers change their character without losing their identity (e.g. gravity getting weaker)? |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Lewis's concrete worlds give a better account of modality (than fictional worlds). When I learn that a man like me drives a truck, I gain evidence for the fact that I can drive a truck. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 12464. Jacobs still rightly rejects this as an account of possibility, since the possibility that I might drive a truck must be rooted in me, not in some other person who drives a truck, even if that person is very like me. |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: Suppose somewhere deep in the rain forest is a book that includes a story about you as a truck-driver. I doubt that you would be inclined the think that that story, that book, is the reason you could have been a truck driver. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This begins to look like a totally overwhelming and obvious reason why possible worlds (especially as stories) don't give a good metaphysical account of possibility. They provide a semantic structure for modal reasoning, but that is entirely different. |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: If we want our semantics for modality to give us insight into the truthmakers for modality, then possible worlds semantics is inadequate. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4.4) | |
A reaction: [See the other ideas of Jacobs (and Jubien) for this] It is an interesting question whether a semantics for a logic is meant to give us insight into how things really are, or whether it just builds nice models. Satisfaction, or truth? |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category. ...Regarding certain things even as alternatives is itself something to be regarded as dishonourable or morally absurd. | |
From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
A reaction: He's very tentative about this, but I think it is a powerful moral idea. See Kekes. He is particularly aiming at utilitarians, who happily assess vile possibilities. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general. | |
From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
A reaction: A nice point. Utilitarians might achieve comparison by totting up the happiness in each situation, but once you include the consequences of the consequences the problems are obvious. Was 1789 a good thing? Too early to say. |
22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Making the best of a bad job is a consequentialist maxim, and it will have something to say even pn the difference between massacring seven million and massacring seven million and one. | |
From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
A reaction: If every life counts, the consequentialists have got something right here. Not caring exactly how many were massacred is a sort of callousness (even when the number can't be established). |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: If the goodness of the world were to consist in people's fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring it about that other people kept their obligations | |
From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2) | |
A reaction: If the maxim of my action is 'ensure that everyone does their duty', presumably that can be universalised. Nelson thought so. It just sounds like a hideous world of self-righteous interference. |
22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Utilitarianism cannot hope to make sense, at any serious level, of integrity. | |
From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 1) | |
A reaction: There will be obvious problems with this. 'My whole platoon got killed, but looking on the bright side, I preserved my integrity'. Once a theory commits entirely to one value, it then has no way to make sense of rival values. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |