89 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01) |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02) |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03) | |
A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense. |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04) | |
A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation. |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
Full Idea: Aletheia: truth | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05) |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06) | |
A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives. |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
Full Idea: Ananke: necessity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07) |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08) |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09) |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10) | |
A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element. |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11) |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12) |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13) |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14) | |
A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical. |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15) | |
A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'. |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
Full Idea: Chronismos: separation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16) |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17) |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18) |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21) |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
Full Idea: Diaphora: difference | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22) |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23) | |
A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation. |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24) |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25) |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26) | |
A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27) |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
Full Idea: Empeiron: experience | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28) |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power? | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31) |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
Full Idea: Enkrateia: control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32) | |
A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled. |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33) |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34) |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35) | |
A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'. |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36) |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
Full Idea: Ergon: function, work | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37) |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38) | |
A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly? |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
Full Idea: Eros: love, desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41) |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42) | |
A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure. |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43) |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44) |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
Full Idea: Horismos: definition | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45) |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
Full Idea: Hule: matter | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46) | |
A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'! |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47) | |
A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'. |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48) | |
A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects. |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51) |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52) |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53) |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54) |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
Full Idea: Meson: the mean | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55) | |
A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances. |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56) | |
A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic. |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57) |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
Full Idea: Morphe: form | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58) |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59) |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61) |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62) | |
A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19 |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
Full Idea: Orexis: desire | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63) |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia'] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64) | |
A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer. |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65) |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66) |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
Full Idea: Philia: friendship | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67) |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68) | |
A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise. |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71) | |
A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English. |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
Full Idea: Physis: nature | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72) |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73) |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74) | |
A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem. |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75) | |
A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too. |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76) |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77) |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78) |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81) |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82) |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83) |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84) |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
Full Idea: Theos: god | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85) |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86) |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87) |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory. |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
Full Idea: To ti estin: essence | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91) |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon] | |
From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92) |
17304 | As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels. |
17306 | If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing. |
17308 | Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts. |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The emerging consensus is that we probably overrate the power of conscious experience in our lives. Freud, of course, said the same thing for different reasons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: [He cites Pockett, Banks and Gallagher 2006]. Freud was concerned with big deep secrets, but the modern view concerns ordinary decisions and perceptions. An important idea, which should incline us all to become Nietzscheans. |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology') | |
A reaction: It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens. |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Morality is 'normative' in the sense that it consists of the extraction of 'good' or 'excellent' practices from common practices. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Naturalism') | |
A reaction: I take normativity not be the mere labelling of certain things as 'good', but as a way of responding to that fact, with some sort of motivation. |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Two explanations came forward in the neo-Darwinian synthesis. Altruism is either 1) person-based reciprocal altruism, or 2) gene-based kin altruism. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Darwin') | |
A reaction: Flanagan obviously thinks there is also 'genuine psychological atruism'. Presumably we don't explain mathematics or music or the desire to travel as either contracts or genetics, so we have other explanations available. |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It would be nice if I could advance the case for Eudaimonics - empirical enquiry into the nature, causes, and constituents of flourishing, …and the case for some ways of living and being as better than others. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 4 'Normative') | |
A reaction: Things seem to be moving in that direction. Lots of statistics about happiness have been appearing. |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: What Marx called 'alienation' is the widespread condition of not being able to discover what one wants, or not being remotely positioned to achieve. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 2 'Expanding') | |
A reaction: I took alienation to concern people's relationship to the means of production in their trade. On Flanagan's definition I would expect almost everyone aged under 20 to count as alienated. |
17305 | I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got? |
17307 | Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation. |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Buddhism rejected the idea of a creator God, and the unchanging self [atman]. They accept the appearance-reality distinction, reward for virtue [karma], suffering defining our predicament, and that liberation [nirvana] is possible through wisdom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Buddhism') | |
A reaction: [Compressed] Flanagan is an analytic philosopher and a practising Buddhist. Looking at a happiness map today which shows Europeans largely happy, and Africans largely miserable, I can see why they thought suffering was basic. |