53 ideas
5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Any good philosophy will need to offer wisdom about who we are as well as about how we ought to be. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 14) | |
A reaction: This sop should be accepted gratefully by fans of bioethics, who seem inclined to think that describing 'how we are' is all that needs to be said. Maybe the key wisdom lies in the relationship between the 'is' and the 'ought' of human nature. |
16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Semantical fact is almost always more interesting than transcendental philosophical fiction. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1 n4) | |
A reaction: An interesting expression of a more sophisticated recent allegiance to linguistic philosophy. There is still a strong allegiance to semantics as a major branch of philosophy, despite caution (e.g. from Nathan Salmon) about its scope. |
5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The inability of science to provide ethical wisdom is partly responsible for our resistance to the scientific image. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 14) | |
A reaction: This seems right. A.J. Ayer, for example, declared "I believe in science", and his account of ethics was vacuously nihilistic. A description of the mechanisms of moral life is not the same as ethical wisdom. |
8920 | Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz] |
Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'. | |
From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9) | |
A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part |
17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: My thesis C says that to specify something or other under which a and b coincide is to specify a concept f which qualifies for this purpose only if it yields a principle of counting for fs. ...I submit that C is false, though a near miss. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.1) |
17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: My principle C seems unnecessary ...since it is one thing to see how many fs there are...but another to have a perfectly general method. ...One could answer whether this f-compliant is the same as that one, but there are too many ways to articulate it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.8) | |
A reaction: His famous example is trying to count the Pope's crown, which is made of crowns. A clearer example might be a rectangular figure divided up into various overlapping rectangles. Individuation is easy, but counting is contextual. |
16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The realist conceptualist may cheerfully admit that the sortal concepts of which we are possessed are the creatures of our interests; …and also that there need be no one way in which we must articulate reality. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.2) | |
A reaction: Wiggins calls himself a 'realist conceptualist'. In his terminology, I seem to be an 'anti-conceptualist realist'. The issue concerns aspects of reality that extend beyond our concepts. The 99th d.p. of the mass of the electron. |
16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What Conceptualism entails is that, although horses and stars are not inventions or artefacts, in order to single out these things we must deploy a conceptual scheme which has been formed in such a way as to make singling them out possible. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I don't quite see why the 'singling out' role of the concepts is the only one that generates them, or makes them fit for purpose. In general, of course, our conceptual scheme is necessarily a response to our experience of the world. |
16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A Chinese encyclopedia classifies animals as belonging to the Emperor, embalmed, tame, sucking pigs, sirens, fabulous, stray dogs, included in this classification, frenzied, innumerable, drawn with a fine brush, etcetera, or look for afar like flies. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.7 n18) | |
A reaction: [This glorious quotation comes from a story by Borges, first spotted by Foucault] |
16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A theory of individuation must comprise at least three things: an elucidation of the primitive concept of identity or sameness; what it is to be a substance that persists through change; and what it is for a thinker to single out the same substance. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Metaphysics seems to need a theory of identity, but I am not yet convinced that it also needs a theory of 'individuation'. Never mind, press on and create one, and see how it looks. Aristotle wanted to explain predication too. |
16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Understanding the concepts involved in individuation can only be characterised by reference to observable commerce between things singled out and thinkers who think or find their way around the world precisely by singling them out. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 1) | |
A reaction: I take individuation to be relatively uninteresting, because I understand identity independently of how we single things out, but Wiggins's reliance on sortals implies that the very identity of things in the world is knee deep in mental activity. |
16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The singling out of a substance at a time reaches backwards and forwards to time before and after that time. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is an inferred history and persistence conditions. Sounds fine in a stable world. We assume (a priori?) that any object will have a space-time line for its duration. |
16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: There could be no singling out tout court unless there could be singling out 'as'. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: I find this claim baffling. Do animals categorise everything they engage with? Are we unable to engage with something if we have not yet categorised it? Surely picking it out is prior to saying that sort of thing it is? |
16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: To say that x falls under f - or that x is an f - is to say what x is (in the sense Aristotle isolated). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a key claim in Wiggins's main principle. I'm not convinced. He wants one main sortal to do all the work. I don't think Aristotle at all intended the 'nature' of an individual thing to be given by a single sortal under which it falls. |
16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can expect that, for every completely determinate continuant, there will be at least one sortal concept that it falls under and that determines a principle of persistence for it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.4) | |
A reaction: I think he has the 'determines' relation the wrong way round! Being a tiger doesn't determine anything about persistence. It is having that nature and those persistence conditions which make it a tiger. And why does he optimistically 'expect' this? |
16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Among the best candidates to play the roles of sortal and substantial predicates are the natural kind words. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: There is always a danger of circularity with this kind of approach. How do we distinguish the genuine natural kinds from the dubious ones? |
16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Ordinary artefacts are individuated, rather indeterminately and arbitrarily, by reference to a parcel of matter so organised as to subserve a certain function. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) |
16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Nominal essences are unsatisfactory because they fail either of necessity or of sufficiency for membership of the intended kind, they leave unexplained how sortals can evolve, and there is no room for culture or context in our reference to kinds. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [a compression of a paragraph] I would have thought that Locke would just say it is tough luck if nominal essences can't do all these things, because that's just the way it is, folks. |
16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The question 'what is it?' refers to the persistence and lifespan of an entity, and so manifests the identity over time of an entity and its persistence, between persistence and existence, and between its existence and being the kind of thing it is. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: The idea that establishing the kind of a thing can do all this work strikes me as false. The lifespan of a 'human' can be between five minutes and a hundred years. Humans have a clear death, but thunderstorms don't. |
16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: We can say of Hume's church that the present church is the same 'church' as the old parish church but not the same 'building' or the same 'stonework' as the old parish church. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.5) | |
A reaction: Unconvinced. This seems to make a 'church' into an abstraction, which might even exist in the absence of any building. And it seems to identify a building with its stonework. Wiggins yearns for a neat solution, but it ain't here. |
16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A thing starts existing only once; and in the case of a clock its proper beginning was at about the time when its maker finished it. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I love the example that challenges this. Take the clock's parts and use them to make other clocks, then collect them up and reassemble the first clock. If the first clock has persisted through this, you have too many clocks. Wiggins spots some of this. |
16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Dispute might break out between priests who favoured the working ship and antiquarians who preferred the reconstruction. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This captures the contextual nature of the dispute very succinctly. Wiggins, of course, thinks that sortals will settle the matter. Fat chance. |
16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Since any definition is an identity, identity itself cannot be defined. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.2 n7) | |
A reaction: This sounds too good to be true! I can't think of an objection, so, okay, identity cannot possibly be defined. We can give synonyms for it, I suppose. [Wrong, says Rumfitt! Definitions can also be equivalences!] |
16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The principle of Leibniz's Law marks off what is peculiar to identity and differentiates it in a way in which transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity (all shared by 'exact similarity, 'equality in pay', etc.) do not. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 1.2) |
16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: Identity is a primitive notion. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.1) | |
A reaction: To be a true primitive it would have to be univocal, but it seems to me that 'identity' comes in degrees. The primitive concept is the minimal end of the degrees, but there are also more substantial notions of identity. |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The famous proof of Barcan Marcus about necessity of identity comes down to simply this: Hesperus is necessarily Hesperus, so if Phosphorus is Hesperus, Phosphorus is necessarily Hesperus. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Since the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus was an a posteriori discovery, this was taken to be the inception of the idea that there are a posteriori necessities. The conclusion seems obvious. One thing is necessarily one thing. |
16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The full Identity of Indiscernibles excludes the existence in this world of a symmetrical object, which is reduced to half of itself by the principle. If symmetrical about all planes that bisect it, it is precluded altogether from existence. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.2) | |
A reaction: A really nice objection. Do the parts even need to be symmetrical? My eyeballs can't be identical to one another, presumably. Electrons already gave the principle big trouble. |
16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The notion of sameness or identity that we are to elucidate is not that of any degree of qualitative similarity but of coincidence as a substance - a notion as primitive as predication. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], Pre 2) | |
A reaction: This question invites an approach to identity through our descriptions of it, rather than to the thing itself. There is no problem in ontology of two substances being 'the same', because they are just one substance. |
16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: It is hard or impossible to conceive of Caesar's not being a man (human). | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 4.5) | |
A reaction: So is it 'hard' or is it 'impossible'? Older generations of philosophers simply didn't read enough science fiction. Any short story could feature Caesar's failure to be a man. His assassination was a disaster for the Martian invasion of 44 BCE. |
16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: What sortal concepts we can bring to bear upon experience determines what we can find there. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 5.6) | |
A reaction: Wiggins would wince at being classed among linguistic relativists of the Sapir-Whorf type, but that's where I'm putting this idea. Wiggins is a realist, who knows there are things out there our concepts miss. He compares it to a fishing net. He's wrong. |
5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Explanation does not entail prediction. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 73n) | |
A reaction: Presumably the inverse of this is also true, as we might be able to predict through pure induction, without knowing why something happened. We predict that smoking is likely to cause cancer. Complex things might be explicable but unpredictable. |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century the dominant idea that causation is collisionlike made mental causation almost impossible to envision. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.136) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This makes Descartes' interaction theory look rather bold, and Leibniz's and Malebranche's rejection of it understandable. Personally I still think of causation as collisionlike, except that the collisions are of very very tiny objects. |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It is easy to explain why certain brain events are uniquely experienced by you subjectively: only you are properly hooked up to your own nervous system to have your own experiences. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 87) | |
A reaction: This is in reply to Nagel's oft quoted claim that mind can only be understood as "what it is like to be" that mind. I agree with Flanagan, and it is nice illustration of how philosophers can confuse themselves with high-sounding questions. |
5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: We only have a sense of our self as continuous, but not as exactly the same. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.178) | |
A reaction: Russell said this too, and it seems to me to be right. Personal identity is far too imprecise for me to assert that I remember my ten-year-old self as being identical to me now. Only physical objects like teddy bears can pass that test. |
5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The self is an abstraction from the story of a person's life that isolates and magnifies the experiences, traits and aspirations that are assigned importance. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.240) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to see personal identity as the central controller of brain activity, the aspect of the biological machine which keeps all the mental events focused on what matters, which is health, safety and happiness. |
5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It is a bad mistake to think we are born with a self; the self develops, and acquiring it requires living in the world. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.260) | |
A reaction: I think this is wrong. He is mistaking a complex cultural concept of the self as the subject for autobiography etc. for the basic biological self which even small animals must have if their brains are to serve any useful purpose in their lives. |
5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: According to Buddhism, the idea of a permanent, constant self is an illusion, and a morally dangerous one. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.161) | |
A reaction: We are familiar with the idea that it might be an illusion, but I am unconvinced by 'morally dangerous'. If you drop both free will and personal identity, I can't see any sort of focus for moral life left, but I am willing to be convinced. |
5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The standard view of free will is that I have something like complete control over what I do. A stronger view (not widely held) is that I also have complete control over what I think and what I feel. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 60n) | |
A reaction: To claim free control of feelings looks optimistic, but it does look as if we can decide to think about something, such as a philosophical problem. Deciding what to say comes somewhere between thought and action. |
5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Free will is said to give us self-control, self-expression, individuality, reasons-sensitivity, rational deliberation, rational accountability, moral accountability, the capacity to do otherwise, unpredictability, and political freedom. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.104) | |
A reaction: Nice list. His obvious challenge is to either say we can live happily without some of these things, or else show how we can have them without 'free will'. Personally I agree with Flanagan that we meet the challenge. |
5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Most people believe we have free will, and that this consists in the ability to circumvent natural law. The trouble is that the only device ever philosophically invented that can do this sort of job is an incorporeal soul or mind. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], Pref) | |
A reaction: I think this is exactly right. We currently have a western world full of people who have rejected dualism, but still cling on to free will, because they think morality depends on it. I think morality depends on personal identity, but not on free will. |
5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: It is unimaginable to me that, despite the feeling that we control what we do, such a strong conception of ourselves as unmoved movers would have been added to our self-image unless we had first conceived of God along these lines. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.107) | |
A reaction: I think this is right, though there are signs in fifth century Greece of contradictory evidence. The 'unmoved mover' seems unformulated before Plato's 'Laws' (idea 1423), but there is an implied belief in free will a hundred years earlier. |
5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: I would say that that my consciousness doesn't seem either physical or non-physical, ..but the belief that the mind is non-physical partly took hold because that fits well with thinking of human agents as free. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.102) | |
A reaction: I think this is right. I personally think there is no such thing as free will, and that belief in it has been the single greatest delusion amongst philosophers (and others) for the last two thousand years. Dualism has now gone, and free will is next. |
5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Behaviourism was notorious in its heyday for having nothing to say about mental causation. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.141) | |
A reaction: This is a bit unfair, as Ryle (idea 2622, following Spinoza, 4862) was one of the first to point out the paradox of 'double causation'. You have to be a mentalist to worry about mental causation, and eliminativists aren't bothered. |
5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Although everyone thinks cars and bodies obey the principles of causation, no one thinks it a deficiency that we don't know strict laws of automechanics or anatomy. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 65) | |
A reaction: This attacks Davidson's claim that there are no strict psycho-physical laws, and I agree with Flanagan. Huge dreams of free will and human dignity are being pinned on the flimsy point that we have no strict laws here. But brains are very complicated. |
5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: One may be committed to the truth of physicalism without being committed to the claim that the essence of an experience is captured fully by a description of its neural realiser. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 90) | |
A reaction: This is a reply to the Leibniz Mill question (idea 2109) about what is missing from a materialist view. Flanagan's point is that just as the essence of a panorama is the view from the hill, so the essence of consciousness requires you to be that brain. |
5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: One can question the idea that emotions are non-rational, fickle and flighty; on the contrary, emotions normally seem to be very apt. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 16) | |
A reaction: This is the modern view of emotion which is emerging from neuroscience, which is greatly superior to traditional views, apart from Aristotle, who felt that wisdom and virtue arose precisely when emotions were apt for the situation. |
16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: The mind conceptualises objects, yet objects impinge upon the mind. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.5) | |
A reaction: A very nice statement of the relationship, and the fact that we don't just make our concepts up. |
16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
Full Idea: A 'conception' of horse is a theory of what a horse is, or what it is to be a horse. The conception is in no way the same as the concept. The conception is of the concept. | |
From: David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Wiggins sounds confident about a sharp distinction here, which I doubt, but some such distinction seems to required. I quite like Williams's 'fat' and 'thin' concepts. |
5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: There are two main pictures of the good person: there is the 'good character', and there is the 'principled actor'. ..The first picture is non-intellectualist, and the second is intellectualist. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.145) | |
A reaction: The second ideal elevates the principle itself above the actor who carries it out. Presumably consistency is a virtue, so a good character will at least pay some attention to principles. A good magistrate comes out the same in both views. |
5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.301n) | |
A reaction: I take cognitivism to be (strictly) the view that morals are knowable in principle. Our intellects might not be up to the task (and so we might have to ask the gods what is right). There is also the possibility that morals might be known by intuition. |
5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: Ethics is the normative science that studies the objective conditions that lead to flourishing of persons. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 17) | |
A reaction: This is a nice slogan for the virtue theory account of the nature of ethics. I think it is the view with which I agree. I am intrigued that he has smuggled the word 'science' in, which is a nice challenge to conventional views of science. |
5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of a cycle of rebirths and reincarnations that are normally required before one achieve nirvana was only proposed in the eighth century CE, and then spread like wildfire among Hindus and, to a lesser extent, among Buddhists. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.166n) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. Plato had proposed it in the fourth century BCE. Presumably Hindus had always been dualists, and then suddenly saw and exciting possibility that followed from it. The doctrine strikes me as (to put it mildly) implausible. |
5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: The idea of the soul could be easily trashed if science does not countenance essences, but science does countenance essences in the form of what are known as 'natural kinds' (such as water, salt and gold). | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.181) | |
A reaction: The existence of any essences at all does indeed make the existence of a soul naturally possible, but scientific natural kinds are usually postulated on a basis of chemical stability. Animals, for example, are no longer usually classified that way. |