Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Sets, Aggregates and Numbers', 'Proper Names' and 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


28 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
     Full Idea: Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
     Full Idea: A person's desires and beliefs tend to cause what they tend to rationalise. This coordination of causality and rationalisation lies at the heart of psychology.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5.3)
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
     Full Idea: If Tully=Cicero is synthetic, the names must have different senses, which seems implausible, for we don't normally think of proper names as having senses in the way that predicates do (we do not, e.g., give definitions of proper names).
     From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.89)
     A reaction: It is probably necessary to prize apart the question of whether Tully 'has' (intrinsically) a sense, from whether we think of Tully in that way. Stacks of books have appeared about this one, since Kripke.
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
     Full Idea: It seems that a proper name could not have a reference unless it did have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?
     From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.91)
     A reaction: This might (just) be the most important question ever asked in modern philosophy, since it provoked Kripke into answering it, by giving a social, causal, externalist account of how names (and hence lots of language) actually work. But Searle has a point.
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle being identical with an object that was originally christened will not suffice, for the force of "Aristotle" is greater than the force of 'identical with an object named "Aristotle"', for not just any object named "Aristotle" will do.
     From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.93)
     A reaction: This anticipates Kripke's proposal to base reference on baptism. I remain unsure about how rigid a designation of Aristotle could be, in a possible world where his father died young, and he became an illiterate soldier who hates philosophy.
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
     Full Idea: To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements. ...Names are pegs on which to hang descriptions.
     From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.94)
     A reaction: This 'cluster' view of Searle's has become notorious, but I think one could at least try to mount a defence. The objection to Searle is that none of the descriptions are necessary, unlike just being the named object.
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
     Full Idea: If asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is 'yes, in a loose sort of way'.
     From: John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.96)
     A reaction: It seems to be inviting trouble to assert that a connection is both 'logical' and 'loose'. Clearly Searle has been reading too much later Wittgenstein. This is probably the weakest point in Searle's proposal, which brought a landslide of criticism.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: We want to know How many what? You must first partition an aggregate into parts relevant to the question, where no partition is privileged. How the partitioned set is to be numbered is bound up with its unique members, and follows from logic alone.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'New Problem')
     A reaction: [Compressed wording of Yourgrau's summary of Frege's 'relativity argument'] Concepts do the partitioning. Yourgau says this fails, because the same argument applies to the sets themselves, as well as to the original aggregates.
Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: Nothing at all is 'intrinsically' numbered.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'What the')
     A reaction: Once you are faced with distinct 'objects' of some sort, they can play the role of 'unit' in counting, so his challenge is that nothing is 'intrinsically' an object, which is the nihilism explored by Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. Aristotle disagrees...
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: The Frege-Maddy definition of number (as the 'property' of being-three) explains why the definitions of Von Neumann, Zermelo and others work, by giving the 'principle of collection' that ties together all threes.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'A Fregean')
     A reaction: [compressed two or three sentences] I am strongly in favour of the best definition being the one which explains the target, rather than just pinning it down. I take this to be Aristotle's view.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: Sets could hardly serve as a foundation for number theory if we had to await detailed results in the upper reaches of the edifice before we could make our first move.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'Two')
You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
     Full Idea: We can address a set with any question at all that admits of a numerical reply. Thus we can ask of {Carter, Reagan} 'How many feet do the members have?'.
     From: Palle Yourgrau (Sets, Aggregates and Numbers [1985], 'On Numbering')
     A reaction: This is his objection to the Fregean idea that once you have fixed the members of a set, you have thereby fixed the unique number that belongs with the set.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
     Full Idea: It is metaphysically necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but not logically necessary, since logical deduction could not reveal its truth, and it is not epistemologically necessary, as the ancient Greeks didn't know the identity. (Natural necessity?)
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
     Full Idea: Since conceivability is the chief method of assessing the claims of metaphysical necessity, I think such claims are incautious.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.6)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
     Full Idea: The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2)
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
     Full Idea: Commonsense psychology is a powerful explanatory theory, and largely correct, but it seems to be profoundly dualist, and treats minds as immaterial spirits which can transmigrate and exist disembodied.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2)
     A reaction: Fans of folk psychology tend to focus on central normal experience, but folk psychology also seems to range from quirky to barking mad. A 'premonition' is a widely accepted mental event.
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
     Full Idea: My view is that the concepts of both the Earth person and the Twin Earth person refer to BOTH forms of diamonds or water (H2O and XYZ).
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.7)
     A reaction: Fair enough, though that seems to imply that my current concepts may actually refer to all sorts of items of which I am currently unaware. But that may be so.
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
     Full Idea: Humans are largely made of H2O, so there could be no twin on Twin Earth, and (as Kuhn noted) nothing with a significantly different structure from H2O could be macroscopically very like water (but topaz and citrine will do).
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1)
     A reaction: A small point, but one that appeals to essentialists like me (see under Natural Theory/Laws of Nature). We can't learn much metaphysics from impossible examples.
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
     Full Idea: The question of what a pre-scientific term extends over is extremely difficult for a Putnam-style externalist to answer. …There seems no good reason to assume that they extend over natural kinds ('whale', 'cat', 'water').
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5.1)
     A reaction: The assumption seems to be that they used to extend over descriptions, and now they extend over essences, or expert references. This can't be right. They have never changed, but now contain fewer errors.
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
     Full Idea: We need to think of concepts as organic entities that can persist through changes of extension.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.3)
     A reaction: This would be 'organic' in the sense of modifying and growing. This is exactly right, and the interesting problem becomes the extreme cases, where an individual stretches a concept a long way.
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
     Full Idea: Is a relationship with diamonds necessary for having a concept of diamonds?
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4)
     A reaction: Probably not, given that I have a concept of kryptonite, and that I can invent my own concepts. Suppose I was brought up to believe that diamonds are a myth?
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
     Full Idea: It has been argued (e.g. by Tyler Burge) that certain relations to other language users are determinants of content.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4)
     A reaction: Burge's idea (with Wittgenstein behind him) strikes me as plausible (more plausible than water and elms determining the content). Our concepts actually shift during conversations.
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
     Full Idea: Empty terms and concepts provide the largest problem for the externalist thesis of the world dependence of concepts.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.2)
     A reaction: A speculative concept could then become a reality (e.g. an invention). The solution seems to be to say that there is an internal and an external component to most concepts.
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
     Full Idea: If we accept Putnam's externalist conclusion about the meaning of a word, it is a short step to a similar conclusion about the contents of the twins' beliefs, desires and so on.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 2.1)
     A reaction: This is the key step which has launched a whole new externalist view of the nature of the mind. It is one thing to say that I don't quite know what my words mean, another that I don't know my own beliefs.
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
     Full Idea: Putnam and Burge claim that there could be two words that a misinformed subject uses to express different concepts, but that express just one concept of the experts.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 3.2)
     A reaction: This pushes the concept outside the mind of the user, which leaves an ontological problem of what concepts are made of, how you individuate them, and where they are located.
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
     Full Idea: To say that contents of my belief are narrow is to say that they are intrinsic to me, hence that any perfect twin of mine would have beliefs with the same contents.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 5)
     A reaction: I personally find this more congenial than externalism. If my twin and I studied chemistry, we would reach identical conclusions about water, as long as we remained perfect twins.
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
     Full Idea: If we identify a psychological property with its causal role then we lose the obvious explanation of why the event has the causal role that it has.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 4.1)
     A reaction: This pinpoints very nicely one of the biggest errors in modern philosophy. There are good naturalistic reasons to reduce everything to causal role, but there is a deeper layer. Essences!
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
     Full Idea: We can't define mass in terms of its causal powers because massive objects do different things in different physical systems. …What an object (or concept) with a given property does depends on what it interacts with.
     From: Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 4.1)
     A reaction: This leaves an epistemological problem, that we believe in mass, but can only get at it within a particular gravitational or inertial system. Don't give up on ontology at this point.