Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explanation in Mathematics', 'Dthat' and 'Platonism and the Spiritual Life'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
     Full Idea: Essences and essential properties do not seem to be useful in mathematical contexts, since all mathematical truths are regarded as necessary (though Kit Fine distinguishes between essential and necessary properties).
     From: Paolo Mancosu (Explanation in Mathematics [2008], §6.1)
     A reaction: I take the proviso in brackets to be crucial. This represents a distortion of notion of an essence. There is a world of difference between the central facts about the nature of a square and the peripheral inferences derivable from it.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The good is not relative, but is rooted in facts about human needs [Santayana]
     Full Idea: The good is by no means relative to opinion, but is rooted in the unconscious and fatal nature of living beings, a nature which predetermines for them the difference between foods and poisons, happiness and misery.
     From: George Santayana (Platonism and the Spiritual Life [1927], p.3), quoted by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 6
     A reaction: That is, he concedes that the good is relative to human beings, but that the relevant facts about human beings are not relative. I think he has the correct picture. The key point is that the good is 'rooted' in something, and doesn't just float free.