9 ideas
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
Full Idea: Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement. | |
From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1 | |
A reaction: This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps. |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288) |
13412 | Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Not all numbers could possibly have been learned à la Frege-Russell, because we could not have performed that many distinct acts of abstraction. Somewhere along the line a rule had to come in to enable us to obtain more numbers, in the natural order. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.165) | |
A reaction: Follows on from Idea 13411. I'm not sure how Russell would deal with this, though I am sure his account cannot be swept aside this easily. Nevertheless this seems powerful and convincing, approaching the problem through the epistemology. |
13413 | We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: Both ordinalists and cardinalists, to account for our number words, have to account for the fact that we know so many of them, and that we can 'recognize' numbers which we've neither seen nor heard. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.166) | |
A reaction: This seems an important contraint on any attempt to explain numbers. Benacerraf is an incipient structuralist, and here presses the importance of rules in our grasp of number. Faced with 42,578,645, we perform an act of deconstruction to grasp it. |
13411 | If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: If we accept the Frege-Russell analysis of number (the natural numbers are the cardinals) as basic and correct, one thing which seems to follow is that one could know, say, three, seventeen, and eight, but no other numbers. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.164) | |
A reaction: It seems possible that someone might only know those numbers, as the patterns of members of three neighbouring families (the only place where they apply number). That said, this is good support for the priority of ordinals. See Idea 13412. |
13415 | An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf] |
Full Idea: No account of an individual number is adequate unless it relates that number to the series of which it is a member. | |
From: Paul Benacerraf (Logicism, Some Considerations (PhD) [1960], p.169) | |
A reaction: Thus it is not totally implausible to say that 2 is several different numbers or concepts, depending on whether you see it as a natural number, an integer, a rational, or a real. This idea is the beginning of modern structuralism. |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism is no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine the truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.271) | |
A reaction: Suddenly I recognise a prominent strand of modern philosophy of language (especially in America) for what it is. |
295 | The good is beautiful [Plato] |
Full Idea: The good is beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 216d) | |
A reaction: also Timaeus 87c |
294 | People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato] |
Full Idea: People say that friendship exists only between good men. | |
From: Plato (Lysis [c.400 BCE], 214d) |