5 ideas
17949 | Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Inquiry is the cause of philosophy. | |
From: Aristotle (Protrepticus (frags) [c.334 BCE]), quoted by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.120 | |
A reaction: The earlier part of the quote says philosophical thinking is inescapable (even if philosophy is impossible). I suppose we would call it 'curiosity'. |
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: The logos (the definition) is a summary statement of the path within a network of objects that one will have to follow in order to locate a particular member of that network. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: I like this because it confirms that Plato (as well as Aristotle) was interested in the particulars rather than in the kinds (which I take to be general truths about particulars). |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
Full Idea: A thing's logos, apparently short as it may be, is implicitly a very rich statement since it ultimately involves familiarity with the whole domain to which that particular object belongs. | |
From: Alexander Nehamas (Episteme and Logos in later Plato [1984], p.234) | |
A reaction: He may be wrong that the logos is short, since Aristotle (Idea 12292) says a definition can contain many assertions. |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42) |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E). | |
From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41) |