Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Categories' and 'Vindication of the Rights of Women'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


49 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is hard to make firm statements on these questions without having examined them many times, but to have gone through the various difficulties is not unprofitable.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 08b23)
     A reaction: Suggesting that philosophy is more like drawing the map than completing the journey.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad, as we see with health and sickness. But the contrary of bad is sometimes good, sometimes not, as we see with excess, opposed by both deficiency and moderation.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13b36)
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too, for if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not black.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a06)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
     Full Idea: How are we to determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §2)
     A reaction: Nice question. If I say 'philosophy is the love of wisdom' and 'philosophy bores me', why should one be part of its definition and the other not? What if I stipulated that the second one is part of my definition, and the first one isn't?
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b16)
     A reaction: This seems to be indicating a category mistake, as he warns us not to attribute the wrong kind of differentiae to something we are picking out.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whereas the true statement [that there is a man] is in no way the cause of the actual thing's existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement's being true.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b18)
     A reaction: Armstrong offers this as the earliest statement of the truthmaker principle. Notice the cautious qualification 'seem in some way'. The truthmaker dependence seems even clearer in falsemaking, where the death of the man falsifies the statement.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b10)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one, whereas if there is one there is not necessarily two.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a29)
     A reaction: The axiomatic introduction of a 'successor' to a number does not seem to introduce this notion of priority, based on inclusiveness. Introducing order by '>' also does not seem to indicate any logical priority.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A line is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join together, a point.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b33)
     A reaction: This appears to be the essential concept of a Dedekind cut. It seems to be an open question whether a cut defines a unique number, but a boundary seems to be intrinsically unique. Aristotle wins again.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of quantities, some are discrete, others continuous. ...Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time and place.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04b20)
     A reaction: This distinction seems to me to be extremely illuminating, when comparing natural numbers with real numbers, and it is the foundation of the Greek view of mathematics.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: He criticises his 'Categories' view, because if primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication the primary being is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate; it would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for primary being.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5
     A reaction: Thus, Politis argues, primary being is essence in the later work. The words 'substance' and 'ousia' cause confusion here, and must be watched closely. Wedin argues that Aristotle merely develops his 'Categories' view, but most disagree.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32)
     A reaction: shadows and objects
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably by called prior by nature.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b12)
     A reaction: Not so clear when you seek examples. The bus is prior to its redness, but you can't have a colourless bus, so being coloured is prior to being a bus. Aristotle's example is a man being prior to the truths about him.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's list of ten categories proved to be the most influential scheme found in his works: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Being-in-a-position, Having, Doing, Being affected.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian schedule of categories - substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, and so forth - appears to peter out inconsequentially.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.7
     A reaction: Compare Idea 5544 for Kant's attempt to classify categories. Personally I like the way Aristotle's 'peter out'. That seems to me a more plausible character for good metaphysics.
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b25)
     A reaction: This sums up the earlier of Aristotle's two metaphysical view, and each of this categories is discussed in the present text.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have worked out his list of categories by considering various questions that one might ask about a particular object, such as What is it? How big is it? How is it qualified? And Where is it?
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance
     A reaction: Of course, to think of his questions, Aristotle already had categories in his mind. How would he approach a proposal to recategorise reality more efficiently?
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
     Full Idea: Aristotle categorised relations as accidents - Socrates's whiteness, the sphericity of this ball - entities dependent on substances. Relations are not substances, so they must be, if anything at all, accidents.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], §7) by John Heil - Relations 'Historical'
     A reaction: Heil says this thought encouraged anti-realist views of relations, which became the norm until Russell.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle is taking a first step in making the distinction between objects and properties central to ontology. This plays virtually no role in Plato, and was overshadowed by the distinction between general and particular.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle I
     A reaction: Frede says he gets in a tangle because he mixes the earlier and the new views. Because we are nowadays in a total muddle about properties, I'm thinking we should go back to the earlier view! Modern commentators make him a trope theorist.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of things there are, some are said of a subject, but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01a20)
     A reaction: See? 'Being a man' is not a property of a man! Only the properties which are 'in' the man are properties of the man. The rest are things which are said 'of' men, usually as classifications. A classification is not a property.
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29)
     A reaction: This is the key passage in all of Aristotle for sortal essentialists like Wiggins, especially the word 'only'. I take it that this observation is superseded by the Metaphysics. Definition is the route to substance (which involves general terms).
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: In Categories 8 there are four species of qualities: States and conditions, Natural capacities and incapacities, Affective qualities or affections, and Shape and external form.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], Ch.8) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b02)
     A reaction: This may be just a truism, or it may be the Aristotelian commitment to universals only existing if they are instantiated.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle abandons the notion of an individual which he had relied on in the 'Categories', since it presupposes that there are general things, that there are universals.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Individuals in Aristotle Intro
     A reaction: Ah, very illuminating. So all the way through we have a concept of individuals, first relying on universals, and then relying on hylomorphism? I suppose a bundle theory of individuals would need universals.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: The reason Aristotle gives for calling species and genera substances is that of what is predicated only they reveal what the primary substance is.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02b29-37) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.6
     A reaction: Thus we should not be misled into thinking that the genus and species ARE the essence. We edge our way towards the essence of an individual by subdividing its categories.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is nothing contrary to substances,…. and a substance does not admit of a more and a less. If this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b33)
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: 'Categories' treats something's being an ultimate subject as a test for being a primary substance, but it does not treat its primary objects as complex bodies consisting of matter and form. In that case, is the composite or a feature the ultimate subject?
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.1
     A reaction: Gill is trying to throw light on the difference between 'Categories' and 'Metaphysics'. Once you have hylomorphism (form-plus-matter) you have a new difficulty in explaining unity. The answer is revealed once we understand 'form'.
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' Aristotle argues the primary being (proté ousia) is the ultimate subject of predication (to hupokeimenon, meaning 'that which lies under'), nowadays referred to as the 'particular substance' view.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4
     A reaction: Politis says that Aristotle shifts to the quite different view in 'Metaphysics', that primary being is essence, rather than mere subject of predication.
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It seems distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. ...For example, an individual man - one and the same - becomes pale at one time and dark at another.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 04a10/20)
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
     Full Idea: The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
     A reaction: It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'.
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
     Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178
     A reaction: The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text.
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11)
     A reaction: This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: In 'Categories' primary substances are individual concrete objects, such as a particular horse, whereas in 'Metaphysics' such things are combinations of matter and substantial form, with the latter being the primary substances.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 9.1
     A reaction: Lowe claims there is no real difference. Aristotle came to think that matter was not part of primary substance, so the shift seems to be that substance was concrete, but then he decided it was abstract. Physicists will prefer 'Metaphysics'.
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances [ousiai] most strictly.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03a04)
     A reaction: This points to a rather minimal account of substance, as possibly the 'bare particular' which has no other role than to have properties. This expands in 'Metaphysics' to be matter which has form, making properties possible.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b10)
     A reaction: The notion of 'primary' substance is confined to this earlier metaphysics of Aristotle.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: The primacy of 'Categories' primary substances is a kind of ontological primacy, whereas the primacy of form is a kind of structural or explanatory primacy.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance X.9
     A reaction: 'Structural' and 'explanatory' sound very different, since the former sounds ontological and the latter epistemological (and more subjective).
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle denigrates the whole category of relations, but modern logical absolutists single out self-relation (in the mode of identity) as metaphysically privileged.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.8
     A reaction: I think this refers to Plantinga and Merrihew Adams, who make identity-with-itself the basic component of individual existences.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
     Full Idea: It is one thing to believe something a priori and another for this belief to be epistemically justified. The latter is required for a priori knowledge.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8)
     A reaction: Personally I would agree with this, because I don't think anything should count as knowledge if it doesn't have supporting reasons, but fans of a priori knowledge presumably think that certain basic facts are just known. They are a priori justified.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Understanding is itself based on a priori commitment.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12)
     A reaction: This sounds plausible, but needs more justification than Horwich offers. This is the sort of New Rationalist idea I associate with Bonjour. The crucial feature of the New lot is, I take it, their fallibilism. All understanding is provisional.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Our a priori commitment to certain sentences is not really explained by our knowledge of a word's meaning. It is the other way around. We accept a priori that the sentences are true, and thereby provide it with meaning.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8)
     A reaction: This sounds like a lovely trump card, but how on earth do you decide that a sentence is true if you don't know what it means? Personally I would take it that we are committed to the truth of a proposition, before we have a sentence for it.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
     Full Idea: A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12)
     A reaction: A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge.
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
     Full Idea: If we stipulate the meaning of 'the number of x's' so that it makes Hume's Principle true, we must accept Hume's Principle. But a precondition for this stipulation is that Hume's Principle be accepted a priori.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §9)
     A reaction: Yet another modern Quinean argument that all attempts at defining things are circular. I am beginning to think that the only a priori knowledge we have is of when a group of ideas is coherent. Calling it 'intuition' might be more accurate.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
     Full Idea: One potential source of a priori knowledge is the innate structure of our minds. We might, for example, have an a priori commitment to classical logic.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §11)
     A reaction: Horwich points out that to be knowledge it must also say that we ought to believe it. I'm wondering whether if we divided the whole territory of the a priori up into intuitions and then coherent justifications, the whole problem would go away.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
     Full Idea: Aristotle reminds us that nothing is to count as predicable that cannot be said-of many things.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1
     A reaction: Thus there wouldn't be any predicates if there were not universals. Could we have proper names for individual qualities (tropes), in the way that we have them for individual objects?
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: 'White' signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species ('man') and the genus ('animal') mark off the qualification of substance - they signify substance of a certain qualification.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 03b18)
     A reaction: This is making a fundamental distinction between two different types of predication. I would describe them as one attributing a real property, and the other attributing a category (as a result of the properties). I don't think 'substance' helps here.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
If women share rights with men, they will exhibit similar virtues [Wollstonecraft]
     Full Idea: Let woman share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man; for she must grow more perfect when emancipated, or justify that authority that chains such a weak being to her duty.
     From: Mary Wollstonecraft (Vindication of the Rights of Women [1792], p.294), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 18 'Wrath'
     A reaction: Presumably this implies that if emancipation led to women exceeding men in such virtues, there would be some justification for imposing the chains on the men rather than the women. Consider wars. Probably best to just abandon chains.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 12b01)
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Change occurs from possession to privation, but from privation to possession is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man grow new ones.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 13a35)
     A reaction: Although this seems like an insight into entropy, it isn't an accurate observation, since trees lose their leaves, and then regain them in spring. Maybe somewhere men regrow their hair each spring.