20 ideas
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics really rests on observations, whether consciously or not. The only reason this is not recognised is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man's experience is so saturated that he pays no particular attention to them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Approach to Metaphysics [1898], p.311) | |
A reaction: I think this is entirely right. I would say that the only thing that distinguishes metaphysical thought is its extreme level of generality, which makes it very hard to substantiate, because it is so remote from its evidential base. |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
Full Idea: How are we to determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §2) | |
A reaction: Nice question. If I say 'philosophy is the love of wisdom' and 'philosophy bores me', why should one be part of its definition and the other not? What if I stipulated that the second one is part of my definition, and the first one isn't? |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The analysis of verisimilitude has been much debated. Some plausible analyses have failed disastrously, others conflict with one another. One conclusion is that verisimilitude seems to consist of several distinguishable virtues. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V n7) | |
A reaction: Presumably if it is complex, you can approach truth in one respect while receding from it in another. It seems clear enough if you are calculating pi by some iterative process. |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I take for granted that a disposition requires a causal basis: one has the disposition iff one has a property that occupies a certain causal role. Shall we then identify the disposition with its basis? That makes the disposition cause its manifestations. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], III) | |
A reaction: Introduce the concept of a 'power' and I see no problem with his proposal. Fundamental dispositions are powerful, and provide the causal basis for complex dispositions. Something had better be powerful. |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I think we are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one outcome rather than another. We cannot explain why one event happened rather than the other. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], VI) | |
A reaction: This misses out an investigation which slowly reveals that a 'chance' event wasn't so chancey after all. Failure to explain confirms chance, so the judgement of chance shouldn't block attempts to explain. |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
Full Idea: It is one thing to believe something a priori and another for this belief to be epistemically justified. The latter is required for a priori knowledge. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
A reaction: Personally I would agree with this, because I don't think anything should count as knowledge if it doesn't have supporting reasons, but fans of a priori knowledge presumably think that certain basic facts are just known. They are a priori justified. |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Understanding is itself based on a priori commitment. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: This sounds plausible, but needs more justification than Horwich offers. This is the sort of New Rationalist idea I associate with Bonjour. The crucial feature of the New lot is, I take it, their fallibilism. All understanding is provisional. |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
Full Idea: Our a priori commitment to certain sentences is not really explained by our knowledge of a word's meaning. It is the other way around. We accept a priori that the sentences are true, and thereby provide it with meaning. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a lovely trump card, but how on earth do you decide that a sentence is true if you don't know what it means? Personally I would take it that we are committed to the truth of a proposition, before we have a sentence for it. |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
Full Idea: A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
A reaction: A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge. |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
Full Idea: If we stipulate the meaning of 'the number of x's' so that it makes Hume's Principle true, we must accept Hume's Principle. But a precondition for this stipulation is that Hume's Principle be accepted a priori. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §9) | |
A reaction: Yet another modern Quinean argument that all attempts at defining things are circular. I am beginning to think that the only a priori knowledge we have is of when a group of ideas is coherent. Calling it 'intuition' might be more accurate. |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
Full Idea: One potential source of a priori knowledge is the innate structure of our minds. We might, for example, have an a priori commitment to classical logic. | |
From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §11) | |
A reaction: Horwich points out that to be knowledge it must also say that we ought to believe it. I'm wondering whether if we divided the whole territory of the a priori up into intuitions and then coherent justifications, the whole problem would go away. |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is said that a good explanation ought to produce understanding, ...but this just says that a good explanation produces possession of that which it provide, so this desideratum is empty. It adds nothing to our understanding of explanation. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V) | |
A reaction: I am not convinced by this dismissal. If you are looking for a test of whether an explanation is good, the announcement that the participants feel they have achieved a good understanding sounds like success. |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The pursuit of general explanations may be very much more widespread in science than the pursuit of general laws. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], IV) | |
A reaction: Nice. I increasingly think that the main target of all enquiry is ever-widening generality, with no need to aspire to universality. |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
Full Idea: It is said that a good explanation ought to show that the explanandum event had to happen, given the laws and circumstances. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V) | |
A reaction: I cautiously go along with this view. Given that there are necessities in nature (a long story), we should aim to reveal them. There is no higher aspiration open to us than successful explanation. Lewis says good explanations can reveal falsehoods. |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation p.237 | |
A reaction: It is hard to challenge this. The assumption is that only nomological and causal explanations are possible, and the former are unobtainable for singular events. |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Here is my main thesis: to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], II) | |
A reaction: The obvious thought is that you might provide some tiny and barely relevant part of that causal history, such as a bird perched on the Titanic's iceberg. So how do we distinguish the 'important' causal information? |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Explaining why struck matches light in general is not so very different from explaining why some particular struck match lit. ...We may generalize modestly, without laying claim to universality. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], IV) | |
A reaction: A suggestive remark, since particular causation and general causation seem far apart, but Lewis suggests that the needs of explanation bring them together. Lawlike and unlawlike explanations? |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
Full Idea: There is no one right way - though there may be more or less natural ways - of carving up a causal history. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: This invites a distinction between the 'natural' causes and the 'real' causes. Presumably if any causes were 'real', they would have a better claim to be 'right'. Is an earthquake the 'real' (correct?) cause of a tsunami? |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Disagreement about 'the' cause is only disagreement about which part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some particular inquiry. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: I don't believe this. In the majority of cases I see the cause of an event, without having any interest in any particular enquiry. It is just so obvious that there isn't even a disagreement. Maybe there is only one sensible enquiry. |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I take causal dependence to be counterfactual dependence, of a suitably back-tracking sort, between distinct events. | |
From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I) | |
A reaction: He quotes Hume in support. 'Counterfactual dependence' strikes me as too vague, or merely descriptive, for the job of explanation. 'If...then' is a logical relationship; what is it in nature that justifies the dependency? |