6 ideas
| 8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
| Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom). | |
| From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119) | |
| A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441). |
| 8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
| Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence. | |
| From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115) | |
| A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7. |
| 8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
| Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity. | |
| From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116) | |
| A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of. |
| 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E). | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41) |
| 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42) |
| 6029 | Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be. | |
| From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127) | |
| A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true. |