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All the ideas for 'Bayesianism', 'Particulars in Particular Clothing' and 'Laches'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
     Full Idea: Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age.
     From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 188b)
     A reaction: I have taught teenagers who seemed to me wiser than nearly all the adults I have ever met.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
     Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
     From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
     A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
     From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
     Full Idea: To be unafraid (like a small child who doesn't understand the danger) and to be brave are two quite different things.
     From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 197b)