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All the ideas for 'Bayesianism', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness'

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7 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

22449	When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
	Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
	A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.

14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem

2799	Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
	Full Idea: Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
	From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)

2798	Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
	Full Idea: Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
	From: Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

2957	Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
	Full Idea: Nagel argues (because of brain bisection experiments) that we should jettison our commonsense assumption that the unity of consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair.
	From: report of Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971]) by Michael Lockwood - Mind, Brain and the Quantum p.84
	A reaction: It seems wrong to call it 'commonsense'. It is an assumption that precedes any judgement, but if you rapidly grasp that your mind is in your brain, it becomes common sense that you can cut lumps out of your mind.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

3285	We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
	Full Idea: As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover.
	From: Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164)
	A reaction: I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22451	All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
	A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

22452	Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
	Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
	A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.