18767
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Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3)
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A reaction:
I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine.
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18771
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Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6)
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A reaction:
There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake!
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18768
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We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5)
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A reaction:
[This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things.
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18765
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Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6)
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A reaction:
I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today.
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18764
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The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
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Full Idea:
In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic.
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From:
C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5)
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A reaction:
The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising.
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9332
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Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
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Full Idea:
Our a priori commitment to certain sentences is not really explained by our knowledge of a word's meaning. It is the other way around. We accept a priori that the sentences are true, and thereby provide it with meaning.
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From:
Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8)
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A reaction:
This sounds like a lovely trump card, but how on earth do you decide that a sentence is true if you don't know what it means? Personally I would take it that we are committed to the truth of a proposition, before we have a sentence for it.
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9341
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Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
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Full Idea:
A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them.
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From:
Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12)
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A reaction:
A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge.
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7535
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If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk]
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Full Idea:
Whether the words 'belief' and 'judgement' mean the same thing is a moot point. Traditionally, a judgement is the assent of mind to a proposition. If one thinks that all beliefs are propositional, then beliefs and judgements are the same thing.
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From:
Ray Monk (Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude [1996], Ch.19 n6)
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A reaction:
If I think I have put a bit too much toothpaste on my brush, that strikes me as a non-propositional judgement, even though it could be spelled out as a proposition. But it also strikes me as a belief.
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