33 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: How are we to determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §2) | |
| A reaction: Nice question. If I say 'philosophy is the love of wisdom' and 'philosophy bores me', why should one be part of its definition and the other not? What if I stipulated that the second one is part of my definition, and the first one isn't? |
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The solution was to turn around the question How can one in the known mathematical scheme express a given experimental situation? and ask Is it true that only such situations can arise in nature as can be expressed in the mathematical formalism? | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) | |
| A reaction: This has the authority of the great Heisenberg, and is the ultimate expression of 'mathematical physics', beyond anything Galileo or Newton ever conceived. I suppose Pythagoras would have thought that Heisenberg was obviously right. |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: It is only through quantum theory that we have learned that exact science is possible without the basis of dogmatic realism. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 05) |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: Certainly quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features, it does not introduce the mind of the physicist as a part of the atomic event. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 03) | |
| A reaction: This should be digested by anyone who wants to erect some dodgy anti-realist, idealist, subjective metaphysics on the basis of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The 1924 idea of the 'probability wave' meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of 'potentia' in Aristotelian philosophy ...a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] As far as I can see, he is talking about a disposition or power, which is exactly between a mere theoretical possibility and an actuality. See the Mumford/Lill Anjum proposal for a third modal value, between possible and necessary. |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: One could consider mass and energy as two different forms of the same 'substance' and thereby keep the idea of substance as indestructible. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The smallest parts of matter are not the fundamental Beings, as in the philosophy of Democritus, but are mathematical forms. Here it is quite evident that the form is more important than the substance of which it is the form. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
| A reaction: Heisenberg is quite consciously endorsing hylomorphism here, with a Pythagorean twist to it. |
| 18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
| Full Idea: In the full exposition of Putnam's mechanism for generating the necessary truth that water is H2O, we find that the mechanism employs a certain nontrivial general principle of essentialism concerning liquid substances as a crucial premise. | |
| From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Nathan Salmon - Reference and Essence (1st edn) 6.23.1 | |
| A reaction: This charge, that Kripke and Putnam smuggle the essentialism into their semantics, rather than deriving it, is the nub of Salmon's criticism of them. It seems to me that a new world view emerged while those two where revising the semantics. |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: It is one thing to believe something a priori and another for this belief to be epistemically justified. The latter is required for a priori knowledge. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
| A reaction: Personally I would agree with this, because I don't think anything should count as knowledge if it doesn't have supporting reasons, but fans of a priori knowledge presumably think that certain basic facts are just known. They are a priori justified. |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Understanding is itself based on a priori commitment. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
| A reaction: This sounds plausible, but needs more justification than Horwich offers. This is the sort of New Rationalist idea I associate with Bonjour. The crucial feature of the New lot is, I take it, their fallibilism. All understanding is provisional. |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Our a priori commitment to certain sentences is not really explained by our knowledge of a word's meaning. It is the other way around. We accept a priori that the sentences are true, and thereby provide it with meaning. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §8) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a lovely trump card, but how on earth do you decide that a sentence is true if you don't know what it means? Personally I would take it that we are committed to the truth of a proposition, before we have a sentence for it. |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12) | |
| A reaction: A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge. |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: If we stipulate the meaning of 'the number of x's' so that it makes Hume's Principle true, we must accept Hume's Principle. But a precondition for this stipulation is that Hume's Principle be accepted a priori. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §9) | |
| A reaction: Yet another modern Quinean argument that all attempts at defining things are circular. I am beginning to think that the only a priori knowledge we have is of when a group of ideas is coherent. Calling it 'intuition' might be more accurate. |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| Full Idea: One potential source of a priori knowledge is the innate structure of our minds. We might, for example, have an a priori commitment to classical logic. | |
| From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §11) | |
| A reaction: Horwich points out that to be knowledge it must also say that we ought to believe it. I'm wondering whether if we divided the whole territory of the a priori up into intuitions and then coherent justifications, the whole problem would go away. |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: When we represent a group of connections by a closed and coherent set of concepts, axioms, definitions and laws which in turn is represented by a mathematical scheme we have isolated and idealised them with the purpose of clarification. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) | |
| A reaction: Attacks on the regularity theory of laws, and the notion that explanation is by laws, tend to downplay this point - that obtaining clarity and precision is a sort of explanation, even if it fails to go deeper. |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment suggests that two thinkers can have identical qualia, despite intending different objects on Earth and Twin Earth, and hence that qualia and intentionality must be logically independent of one another. | |
| From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: [See Idea 4099, Idea 3208, Idea 7612 for Twin Earth]. Presumably my thought of 'the smallest prime number above 10000' would be a bit thin on qualia too. Does that make them 'logically' independent? Depends what we reduce qualia or intentionality to. |
| 4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
| Full Idea: Putnam claims that the Twins have different thoughts even though their heads are the same, so their thoughts (about 'water' or 'XYZ') cannot be in their heads. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 4.37 | |
| A reaction: Is Putnam guilty of a simple confusion of de re and de dicto reference? |
| 12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Putnam presumes it is correct to say that ice and steam are forms of water, rather than that ice, water and steam are three forms of H2O. If we allow the latter, then 'water is H2O' is not an identity, but elliptical for 'water is H2O in liquid state'. | |
| From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 8.2 | |
| A reaction: This nice observation seems to reveal that the word 'water' is ambiguous. I presume the ambiguity preceded the discovery of its chemical construction. Shakespeare would have hesitated over whether to say 'water is ice'. Context would matter. |
| 3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: Putnam argued that "water" refers to H2O by virtue of causal chains extending from present use back to early dubbing uses of it that were in fact dubbings of the substance H2O (although, of course, the original users of the word didn't know this). | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 9.2.1 | |
| A reaction: This is the basic idea of the Causal Theory of Reference. Nice conclusion: most of us don't know what we are talking about. Maybe the experts on H2O are also wrong... |
| 3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
| Full Idea: Putnam argues that, Frege notwithstanding, it is often the case that reference determines sense, and not vice versa. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 19.6 | |
| A reaction: Does this say anything more than that once you have established a reference, you can begin to collect information about the referent? |
| 11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: If there is a hidden structure, then generally it determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind, ...in all possible worlds. Put another way, it determines what we can and cannot counterfactually suppose about the natural kind. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975], p.241) | |
| A reaction: This is the arrival of the bold new view of natural kinds (which is actually the original view - see Idea 8153). One must be careful of the necessity here. There is causal context, vagueness etc. |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Science has seven closed systems of concepts and axioms: Newtonian mechanics; the theory of heat; electricity and magnetism; quantum theory; the theory of elementary particles; general relativity; and the theory of organic life. | |
| From: report of Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: [my summary of pp.86-88 and 92] It is interesting to have spelled out that there are number of 'closed' theories, which are only loosely connected to one another. New discoveries launch whole new theories, instead of being subsumed. |
| 11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
| Full Idea: Putnam takes causes to be the essence of disease kinds, and they are distinct from the diseases they cause, both in identity and in proper parthood. These are relational properties, so Putnam gives examples of natural kinds with relational essences. | |
| From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Neil E. Williams - Putnam's Traditional Neo-Essentialism §4 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a nice point, since scientific essentialism invariable takes itself to be pursuing instrinsic properties when it unravels the essences of natural kinds. Probably the best response is the Putnam has got muddled. |
| 11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: When Archimedes asserted that something was gold, he was not just saying that it had the superficial characteristics of gold; he was saying that it had the same general hidden structure (the same 'essence', so to speak) as any normal piece of local gold. | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975], p.235) | |
| A reaction: This is one of the key announcements of the new scientific essentialism, and seems to me to be totally correct. Obviously Archimedes could say 'this is really gold, even if it no way appears to be gold'. |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: Energy is the substance from which all elementary particles, all atoms and therefore all things are made, and energy is that which moves. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what energy is, but I like this because it says that nature is fundamentally active. Nothing makes sense without that basic assumption (on which Leibniz continually insists). |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: Energy is a substance, since its total amount does not change. ...Energy can be changed into motion, into heat, into light and into tension. Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
| A reaction: Grandiose stuff. I remain unconvinced that Heisenberg (clever fellow, I'm told) has any idea of what he is talking about. |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: In the theory of fields of force one came back to the older idea, that action is transferred from one point to a neighbouring point. ...With Maxwell the fields of force seemed to have acquired the same degree of reality as the body's of Newton's theory. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: How could it be that the same radiation that produces interference patterns, and therefore must consist of waves, also produces the photoelectric effect, and therefore must consist of moving particles. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The knowledge of the position of a particle is complementary to the knowledge of its velocity or momentum. If we know one with high accuracy we cannot know the other with high accuracy; still we must know both for determining the behaviour of the system. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 03) | |
| A reaction: This is the famous Uncertainty Principle, expressed in plain language by the man himself. At this point we lost our grip on the prospects of determining the behaviour of natural systems. |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The idea that electromagnetic waves could be a reality in themselves, independent of any bodies, did at that time not occur to the physicists. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) | |
| A reaction: 'At that time' is when they thought the waves must travel through something, called the 'ether'. |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: The first new model of the atom could not explain the most characteristic features of the atom, its enormous stability. No planetary system following the laws of Newton's mechanics would ever go back to its original configuration after a collision. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 02) |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: From our modern point of view we would say that the empty space between the atoms was not nothing; it was the carrier of geometry and kinematics. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 04) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what the 'carrier of geometry and kinematics' means, but it is interesting that he doesn't mention 'fields' (unless they carry the kinematics?) |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: In classical theory we assume past and future are separated by an infinitely short time interval called the present moment. In relativity it is different: future and past are separated by a finite time interval dependent on the distance from the observer. | |
| From: Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 07) | |
| A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it is a revelation to realise that not only is time made relative to observers, but the length of the 'present moment' also becomes relative. The infinitesimal present moment has always bothered me. |