29 ideas
| 22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was the first scholastic to hold that the concept of being and other transcendentals were univocal, not only in application to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: So either it exists or it doesn't. No nonsense about 'subsisting'. Russell flirted with subsistence, but Quine agrees with Duns Scotus (and so do I). |
| 22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus said the primary object of the created intellect was being, rejecting Aquinas's Aristotelian view that it was limited to the quiddity of the sense particular, and Henry of Ghent's Augustinian view that it was God. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: I suppose the 'primary object of the intellect' is the rationalist/empiricism disagreement. So (roughly) Aquinas was an empiricist, Duns Scotus was a rationalist, and Augustine was a transcendentalist? Augustine sounds like Spinoza. |
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was a realist on the issue of universals and one of the main adversaries of Ockham's programme of nominalism. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: The view of Scotus seems to be the minority view. It is hard to find thinkers who really believe that universals have an independent existence. My interest in Duns Scotus waned when I read this. How does he imagine universals? |
| 22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Rejecting the standard views that essences are individuated by either actual existence, quantity or matter, Scotus said that the principle of individuation is a further substantial difference added to the species - the so-called haecceitas or 'thisness'. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: [Scotus seldom referred to 'haecceitas'] I suppose essences have prior existence, but are too generic, so something must fix an essence as pertaining to this particular object. Is the haecceitas part of the essence, or of the particular? |
| 22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus endorsed Avicenna's theory of the common nature, according to which the essences have an independence and priority to their existence as either universal in the mind or singular outside it. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: I occasionally meet this weird idea in modern discussions of essence (in Lowe?), and now see its origin. It makes little sense without a divine mind to support the independent essences. Scotus had to add a principle of individuation for essences. |
| 22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus grounded certitude in the knowledge of self-evident propositions, induction, and awareness of our own state. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Induction looks like the weak link here. |
| 22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus allocated to the intellect a direct, existential awareness of the intelligible object, called 'intuitive cognition', in contrast to abstractive knowledge, which seized the object independently of its presence to the intellect in actual existence. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Presumably if you see a thing, shut your eyes and then know it, that is 'abstractive'. Scotus says open your eyes for proper knowledge. |
| 22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus rejected Henry of Ghent's defence of Augustine's of knowledge by 'illumination', as leading to nothing but scepticism. ...After this, illumination never made a serious recovery. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 |
| 22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus said the will is a power for opposites, in the sense that even when actually willing one thing, it retains a real, active power to will the opposite. He detaches the idea of freedom from time and variability. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: In the sense that we can abandon an action when in the middle of it, this seems to be correct. Not just 'I could have done otherwise', but 'I don't have to be doing this'. This shows that the will has wide power, but not that it is 'free'. |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
| 22673 | Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
| A reaction: Seems like a chicken and egg issue. I would have thought that association precedes the development of a village. |
| 22676 | The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The people in themselves are only individuals; and the special reason why they need to be united under one government is that they may appear to advantage before foreigners. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an observation on 1830s America, rather than a universal truth. It fits modern western societies rather well though. |
| 22679 | Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of men than vast empires. …But there is a love of glory in those who regard the applause of a great people as a worthy reward. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the main the problem is the central dominance over distant colonies. There may also be some freedom in being distant from the centres, especially in 1830. The Wild West. |
| 22680 | People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: If none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: In modern times many small states have appeared in Europe (in the Balkans and on the Baltic), and it looks to me a good thing. The prospect of Scottish independence may currently be looming, and De Tocqueville would approve. |
| 22675 | In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution, rather than on the laws. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.05) | |
| A reaction: Obviously the Constitution is one short document, so the details must be enshrined in the laws (which presumably defer to the Constitution). |
| 22677 | A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The advantages of a monarchy are that the private interests of a family are connected with the interests of the state, …and at least there is always someone available to conduct the affairs of a monarchy. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: The second one is not much of a reason! The same defence can be given for the dominance of the Mafia. His defences are deliberately feeble, I suspect. England had plenty of monarchs who showed limited interest. |
| 22683 | Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: In despotic states the sovereign is so much attached to his power that he dislikes the constraints even of his own regulations, and likes to see his agents acting irregularly. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: A nice observation. What would Machiavelli say? At least the citizens can see where the real power resides. |
| 22669 | Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: Land is the basis of an aristocracy; …it is by landed property handed down from generation to generation that an aristocracy is constituted. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: Presumably there can be aristocrats by mere royal patronage, who have perhaps gambled away their land. They need protection by the other aristocrats. |
| 22674 | In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The partisans of centralisation in Europe are wont to maintain that the government can administer the affairs of each locality better than the citizens can do it for themselves. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
| A reaction: In the modern UK we have lots of local government, which is thoroughly starved of funds by the central government. He is contrasting it with the strong local system in the U.S. |
| 22678 | An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: The period which immediately precedes an election, and that during which the election is taking place, must always be considered as a national crisis. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: Rousseau said something similar. Election day in modern Britain is very peaceful and civilised, but it used to be chaotic. The weeks preceding it are invariably nasty. |
| 22682 | Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: Universal suffrage is by no means a guarantee of the wisdom of the popular choice. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
| A reaction: This was precisely Plato's fear about democracy. There seems no way at all of preventing the people from electing representatives on superficial grounds of personality. |
| 22670 | Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: Slavery dishonours labour; it introduces idleness into society, and with idleness, ignorance and pride, luxury and distress. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: A pretty feeble reason (in the 1830s) for disliking slavery. He seems only concerned with the adverse effects on the slave-owning society, and shows no interest in the slaves themselves. |
| 22681 | The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: I approve of the liberty of the press from a consideration more of the evils it prevents than of the advantages it ensures. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.10) | |
| A reaction: He accepts the freedom of the press as inevitable in a democracy, but he found U.S. newspapers to be nearly as bad then as they are now. |
| 22672 | It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: One manly and lawful passion for equality elevates the humble to the rank of the great. But there exists also a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: There is a distinction in modern political rhetoric between 'levelling down' and 'levelling up'. Since levelling down is just destructive, and levelling up is unaffordable, it seems obvious that true equality needs to be a compromise. |
| 22671 | Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville] |
| Full Idea: I know of only two methods of establishing equality in the political world; rights must be given to every citizen, or none at all to anyone. | |
| From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
| A reaction: We may have a vague concept of 'natural' rights, but primarily they are a tool of social engineering. You could grant equal rights on inheritance, for example, which turn out in practice to hugely favour the rich. |
| 22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus establishes God as first efficient cause, as ultimate final cause, and as most eminent being - his so-called 'triple primacy' - and says there is a unique nature within these primacies. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: This is the first stage of Duns Scotus's unusually complex argument for God's existence. Asserting the actual infinity of this unique being concludes his argument. |
| 22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus rejected the traditional argument that the infinity of God can be inferred from creation ex nihilo. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: He accepted the infinity of God, however, but not for this reason. I don't know why he rejected it. I suppose the rejected claim is that something has to be infinite, and if it isn't the Cosmos then that leaves God? |