10 ideas
| 5021 | An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Every idea is analysed perfectly only when it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.3) | |
| A reaction: I take it he means metaphysical possibility, rather than natural, or we can't think about pigs flying. He probably has maths in mind. Seeing the possibility of something may well amount to understanding its truth conditions. |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'Logical constants', which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the propositions in the verbal expressions of which their names occur. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: This seems to entirely deny the existence of logical constants, and yet he says that they are named. Russell was obviously under pressure here from Wittgenstein. |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Such words as or, not, all, some, plainly involve logical notions; since we use these intelligently, we must be acquainted with the logical objects involved. But their isolation is difficult, and I do not know what the logical objects really are. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], 1.IX) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 23476, from the previous page. Russell is struggling. Wittgenstein was telling him that the constants are rules (shown in truth tables), rather than objects. |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| Full Idea: A touchstone by which logical propositions may be distinguished from all others is that they result from a process of generalisation which has been carried to its utmost limits. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913], p.129), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What' |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's pre-war conception it is obvious that a complex cannot be negative. If a complex were true, what would make it false would be its non-existence, not the existence of some other complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Knowledge [1913]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 41 'Neg' | |
| A reaction: It might be false because it doesn't exist, but also 'made' false by a rival complex (such as Desdemona loving Othello). |
| 5020 | Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Whatever is thought by us is either conceived through itself, or involves the concept of another. …Thus one must proceed to infinity, or all thoughts are resolved into those which are conceived through themselves. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to embody the rationalist attitude to foundations. I am sympathetic. Experiences just come to us as basic, but they don't qualify as 'thoughts', let alone knowledge. Experiences are more 'given' than 'conceptual'. |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
| 5019 | Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The supreme happiness of man consists in the greatest possible increase of his perfection. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking [1679], p.1) | |
| A reaction: I fear that (being a great intellectual) he had a rather intellectual interpretation of 'perfection'. This is in danger of being a tautology, but if the proposal is given an Aritotelian slant I am sympathetic. |