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All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'Reality without Reference' and 'fragments/reports'

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16 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics, placing all experience within themselves, thought such evidence was insufficient warrant for certainty about reality, and withdrew as in a siege from the world, admitting that objects 'appear', but refusing to pronounce the word 'are'.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes §1120
     A reaction: This seems to be the most extreme position found in ancient thought. It accompanies their extreme hedonism, based on the reality of experience and lack of interest in anything external. A bit daft, really.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth - a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.132)
     A reaction: It is a moot point whether we can define meaning if we assume truth, or if we can define truth by assuming meaning. Tarski seems to presuppose meaning when he defines truth (Idea 2345). I like Davidson's taking of truth as basic.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
     Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137)
     A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good.
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The essential question is whether reference is the, or at least one, place where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions, or objects described in nonlinguistic terms.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.134)
     A reaction: How do you 'describe objects in nonlinguistic terms'? The causal theory of reference (e.g. Idea 4957) is designed to plug language straight into the world via reference. It simplifies things nicely, but I don't quite believe it.
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
     Full Idea: I defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of language.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.136)
     A reaction: He proposes to connect language to the world via the concept of truth, rather than of reference. It is a brilliant idea, and is the key issue in philosophy of language. I go back to animals, which seem to care about situations rather than things.
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It is inconceivable that one should be able to explain the relationship between 'Kilimanjiro' and Kilimanjiro without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; hence there is no chance of explaining reference directly in nonlinguistic terms.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.135)
     A reaction: I point at the mountain, and a local says 'Kilimanjiro'? There is a 'gavagai'-type problem with that. The prior question might be 'what is it about this word that enables it to have a role in sentences?' Unlike whimpering or belching.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics say that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say errors should be pardoned, because men do not err intentionally but are influenced by circumstances; one should not hate a person, but only teach him better.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
     A reaction: A very appealing suggestion, and rather wonderful for its time. There is still implied agreement about what is 'error', and what counts as 'better'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics taught that there was nothing naturally and intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were considered so because of law and fashion.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
     A reaction: As we would say now, values and virtues are 'cultural constructs'. This obviously contains a lot of truth, but I don't think our opposition of genocide is just 'fashion'.
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.8
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics say wise men are sufficient to themselves, and so have no need of friends.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.13