Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Folk Psychology', 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' and 'Entity and Identity'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta

16980	We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: There is a good case for a conservative reform of the word 'object'. Objects in the 'logical' sense would be all predicate-worthy identifiabilia whatever. Objects in the 'ontological' sense would form one ontological category among many others.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I n4)
	A reaction: This ambiguity has caused me no end of confusion (and irritation!). I wish philosophers wouldn't hijack perfectly good English words and give them weird meanings. Nice to have a distinguished fellow like Strawson make this suggestion.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

16979	It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P]
	Full Idea: For no object is there a unique character or relation by which it must be identified if it is to be identified at all. This is why it makes no sense to ask, impersonally and in general, of some individual object what makes it the individual object it is.
	From: Peter F. Strawson (Entity and Identity [1978], I)
	A reaction: He links this remark with the claim that there is no individual essence, but he seems to view an individual essence as indispensable to recognition or individuation of the object, which I don't see. Recognise it first, work out its essence later.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

14288	'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: According to Jackson, in asserting 'If A,B' the speaker expresses his belief that A⊃B, and also indicates that this belief is 'robust' with respect to the antecedent A - the speaker would not abandon A⊃B if he were to learn that A.
	From: report of Frank Jackson (On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals [1979]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 4.2
	A reaction: The point is that you must not believe A⊃B solely on the dubious grounds of ¬A. This is 'to ensure an assertable conditional is fit for modus ponens' - that is, that you really will affirm B when you learn that A is true. Nice idea.

13769	Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
	Full Idea: Jackson holds that conditionals are truth-functional, but are governed by rules of assertability, rather like 'but' compared to 'and'. The belief must be 'robust' - the speaker would not abandon his belief that A⊃B if he were to learn that A.
	From: report of Frank Jackson (On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals [1979]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.3.2
	A reaction: This seems to spell out more precisely the pragmatic approach to conditionals pioneered by Grice, in Idea 13767. The idea is make conditionals 'fit for modus ponens'. They mustn't just be based on a belief that ¬A.

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

7518	If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
	A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.

7519	Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.

7520	Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
	Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
	From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.